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Conventional wisdom states that fiscal policy redistributes little in Latin America. Lower tax revenues 
and – above all – lower and less progressive transfers have been identified as the main cause. Existing 
studies show that, while in Europe the distribution of all transfers combined (cash and in-kind) is 
egalitarian, the bulk of transfers in Latin America accrue to the upper quintile. Through an in-depth 
fiscal incidence analysis applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru we argue that 
conventional wisdom may be wrong. First, the extent and effectiveness of income redistribution and 
poverty reduction, revenue-collection, and spending patterns vary so significantly across countries 
that speaking of ―Latin America‖ as a unity is misleading. The (after direct taxes and transfers) Gini, 
for example, declines by over 10 percent in Argentina but by only 2.4 percent in Bolivia. In 
Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia government revenues are close to 40 percent of GDP, whereas in 
Mexico and Peru they are around 20 percent. Social spending (excluding contributory pensions) as a 
share of GDP ranges from 17 percent in Brazil to 5.2 percent in Peru. Second, social spending does 
not accrue to the richest quintile. On the contrary, concentration coefficients for social spending are 
highly negative (progressive in absolute terms) for Argentina and slightly so for Bolivia and Mexico. 
In Brazil and Peru social spending is progressive in relative terms only. Third, there is no obvious 
correlation between the size of government and the size of social spending, on the one hand, and the 
extent and effectiveness of redistribution, on the other: government size is similar for Argentina and 
Bolivia but they are on opposite sides in terms of the extent of redistribution. Fourth, due to indirect 
taxes households are net payers to the ―fisc‖ beginning in the third decile in Bolivia and Brazil; for 
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Argentina, Mexico and Peru this happens in the fifth decile. Fifth, corrective measures differ too: in 
Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil they may involve the reduction in revenues and total spending, while 
revenues and social spending (especially direct transfers to the poor) should be increased in Mexico 
and Peru. Bolivia and Brazil need to introduce changes to their tax and transfer system so that net 
payers to the ―fisc‖ start at higher incomes. All five countries need to improve the progressivity of 
their spending, including non-social spending components. 
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Conventional wisdom states that fiscal policy redistributes relatively little in Latin America, 
especially when compared with high-income democracies in Western Europe (Breceda et al., 2008; 
Goñi et al., 2011).Existing research blames lower tax revenues and – above all – lower and less 
progressive transfers for this outcome.  Lower transfers, it is argued, are primarily due to the 
differences in revenue collection rather than the composition of spending: i.e., the share of spending 
allocated to transfers in the budget in Latin America is similar to that found in Western European 
countries.  In addition, while in Europe the distribution of all transfers combined (cash and in-kind) 
is egalitarian, the bulk of transfers in Latin America accrue to the upper quintiles. 
Through an in-depth fiscal incidence analysis applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru we argue that conventional wisdom may be wrong. First, the extent and effectiveness of 
income redistribution and poverty reduction, revenue-collection, and spending patterns vary so 
significantly across countries that speaking of ―Latin America‖ is misleading. The (after direct taxes 
and transfers) Gini, for example, declines by over 10 percent in Argentina but by only 2.4 percent in 
Bolivia. In Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia government revenues are close to 40 percent of GDP, 
whereas in Mexico and Peru they are around 20 percent.  Social spending as a share of GDP ranges 
from 17 percent in Brazil to 5.2 percent in Peru. Second, social spending (excluding contributory 
pensions) does not accrue to the richest quintile. On the contrary, concentration coefficients for 
social spending are highly negative (progressive in absolute terms) for Argentina and slightly so for 
Bolivia and Mexico. In Brazil and Peru social spending is progressive in relative terms only. Third, 
there is no obvious correlation between the size of government and the size of social spending, on 
the one hand, and the extent and effectiveness of redistribution, on the other: government size is 
similar for Argentina and Bolivia but they are on opposite sides in terms of the extent of 
redistribution.  Fourth, due to indirect taxes households are net payers to the ―fisc‖ starting in the 
third decile in Bolivia and Brazil; for Argentina, Mexico and Peru this happens in the fifth decile. 
We attempt to assess the distributive impact of the full range of fiscal interventions. That is, we 
start –whenever possible—from market or primary income and sequentially estimate the incidence 
of. direct taxes and contributions to the social security system, ii. direct cash and in-kind transfers, iii. 
Indirect taxes and subsidies, and iv. in-kind transfers in the form of free or quasi-free services such 
as education and health.
3As is always the case with this type of analysis, some caveats are in order. 
Since household surveys do not always include information on direct taxes or transfers from specific 
programs (or on expenditures needed to estimate indirect taxes), their incidence was sometimes 
estimated by inference, imputation or simulation (explained in more detail below). Although most of 
the incidence analysis has been done by the authors, the incidence of direct taxes in the cases of 
Argentina and Mexico, for example, was obtained from secondary sources.  These two factors raise 
                                                           
3 Income concepts and their components are described in section 2 below.  The methods and sources used to build the income 
concepts and their components are in Appendix A. 4 
 
some issues of comparability across countries; however, other available studies face the same 
limitation. Second, because we look at the average incidence effects, we leave out potential 
systematic differences between average and marginal incidence.
4 Finally, our analysis does not take 
into account general equilibrium effects, incidence or redistribution over the life-cycle or differences 
in the quality of public spending.
5 Hence, this exercise should be viewed as a first-approximation of 
the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews the main results of some existing studies 
on fiscal policy and redistribution. Section 2 presents a brief description of concepts, definitions and 
methodology. Section 3 summarizes the results of our incidence analysis for Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Mexico and Peru.  The main conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
 
1.  Conventional Wisdom: Little Redistribution, Low Revenues, Low Transfers and Low 
Progressivity 
Fiscal policy can reduce poverty and inequality substantially or slightly depending on the size of 
the government and how progressive the collection of revenues and spending patterns are. High-
income European democracies tend to redistribute a great deal (even if the analysis is confined to 
the non-retired population). For example, Barnard (2009) finds that the Gini coefficient for non-
retired households in the UK declined by a staggering 10 percentage points (from .44 to .34) after 
direct taxes and (cash) transfers (but less so when indirect taxes were factored in (from .44 to .38)). 
DeFina and Thanawala (2004) find that direct transfers and taxes reduce the severity of poverty by 
over 90 percent in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, and Ireland and by 48 percent in the United 
States.  
Breceda et al. (2008) report that social spending (which includes cash and in-kind transfers) in 
the UK raised the bottom 20 percent’s income by 15 percent while the richest 20 percent’s was 
increased by 5 percent. In contrast, for six (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala Nicaragua and 
Peru) of the seven Latin American countries included in the study, there was a flat income increase 
of around 5 percent for all quintiles
6; in the seventh country (Honduras)social spending was 
regressive (or, using our definitions described below, progressive in relative terms).  Goñi et al. 
(2011) find that for fifteen Western European countries, the average Gini coefficient declines by 15 
percentage points(from .46 to .31) moving from market (before direct taxes and transfers) income to 
disposable income; in contrast, for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru the Gini 
declines by only two percentage points (from .52 to .50).  When you factor in the effect of indirect 
taxes, the redistributive effect is tempered in both regions, but the contrast is still striking: the Gini 
declines by 12 percentage points in Europe and only 1 percentage point in Latin America.  
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Using  Engel  et  al.’s  (1999)  analytical  framework,  Goñi  et  al.  conclude  that  the  lower  fiscal 
redistribution in  Latin America is a result of low tax revenues and  – above all  – lower and less 
progressive transfers. The neutral or even regressive incidence of the tax system (direct and indirect 
taxes  combined)  plays  a  secondary  role;  in  those  European  countries  that  show  a  substantial 
redistributive effort, cash transfers account for the bulk of redistribution.  While European countries 
devote 14.7 percent of GDP to cash transfers (mostly through their social insurance schemes), the 
six Latin American countries they study devote an average of 7.3 percent of GDP; the authors find 
that lower transfers are primarily due to the differences in revenue collection (and, thus, an ability to 
spend  more)  rather  than  the  composition  of  spending  (i.e.,  the  share  of  spending  allocated  to 
transfers  in  the  budget  is  similar  between  the  two  groups).    In  addition,  while  in  Europe  the 
distribution of all transfers combined (cash and in-kind) is egalitarian, the bulk of transfers in Latin 
America accrue to the upper quintiles.  The exception is targeted cash transfers which are strongly 
progressive:  close  to  75  percent  of  the  resources  accrue  to  the  bottom  two  quintiles  of  the 
population. (Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006) However, targeted cash transfers represent a small 
share of government spending: for example, ―while in the United Kingdom per capita cash transfers 
to the poorest income quintile amount to 6.9 percent of GDP per capita, the average in our Latin 
American sample equals less than one percent, with the country spending the most – Mexico – 
transferring only 1.1 percent to the poor.‖ (Breceda et al., p. 13) 
 
In the last ten years, with the introduction of large-scale
7 cash transfers and an emphasis on 
universal coverage of basic education and health, social spending in Latin America has become more 
pro-poor. (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010) Is it still true that Latin America redistributes relatively 
little? If the answer is affirmative, is this because government revenues are low and government 
spending is not only low but insufficiently progressive?  Does social spending tend to accrue to the 
richest quintiles? Are direct cash transfers – even if progressive – too small?  These are some of the 
questions we shall address below. But first, because the literature on incidence analysis does not 
have established conventions on some key aspects pertaining incidence analysis, the next section will 
include a discussion of the concepts, definitions, methodologies and data used in our study. 
 
 
2.  Concepts, Definitions, Methodological Issues and Data
8 
 
i.  Market,  Net  Market,  Disposable,  Post-fiscal  and  Final  Income:  Definitions  and 
Measurement 
 
The starting point of any incidence study must be a measure of household income. In an 
ideal world, we would use permanent comprehensive household per capita income before taxes and 
government transfers as the basic measure of income.  Such a measure should include monetary and 
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nonmonetary income such as gross wages and salaries, fringe benefits, income from capital (rents, 
interests, dividends, profits, and so on), self-employed gross income, government transfers, social 
security pensions (individual accounts or pay-as-you-go), remittances, income in-kind (free or quasi-
free education and health services, for example), income from owner occupied housing (also known 
as imputed rent), auto- or self-consumption (important in societies with a significant proportion of 
peasant farming), retained earnings, plus corporate taxes and property taxes that reduce returns.  
Ideally, we would have this information for several years in order to estimate a ―permanent‖ 
measure of income. In this study, the information on income is obtained from household surveys 
and the analysis is carried out for a specific year: the most recent year available when the study was 
launched.
9 Depending on the country, household surveys include some but not all the income 
categories just defined.  In what follows we describe the definitions of income used here. A more 
detailed description of the household surveys and the methods (and sources) used to generate each 
income concept and its components appear in Appendix A. 
In what follows we present the definitions of market, net market, disposable, post-fiscal, and 
final income (and final income*) that were used in our analysis. Market (also known as primary) income 
is defined as earned plus unearned market incomes before government taxes and transfers of any 
sort. It includes net private transfers, net remittances, and net alimony payments. Ideally, it should 
also include imputed rent for owner-occupied housing and auto-consumption.
10Net market income 
equals market income minus direct taxes and employee contributions to social security. Disposable 
income equals net market income plus direct monetary transfers. Post-fiscal income equals disposable 
income plus indirect subsidies and minus indirect taxes. Final income equals post-fiscal income plus 
in-kind transfers (e.g., the imputed value of free or quasi-free government services particularly in 
education and health), minus in-kind taxes, co-payments in cash or in-kind (e.g., when beneficiaries 
of anti-poverty programs are required to contribute with inputs such as labor inputs), user fees and 
participation  costs  (e.g.,  transportation  costs,  opportunity  costs).  (Diagram  1)  Because  some 
countries do not have data on indirect subsidies and taxes, we defined final income* as disposable 
income plus in-kind transfers. 
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A very important decision when constructing income categories is where to put social security 
pensions. On this, the literature is divided: some authors include public contributory pensions with 
market income while others add them to government transfers. The Microsimulation and Public 
Policy Analysis Unit project in the Paris School of Economics
11 includes social security pensions as 
part of market (primary) incomes. Breceda et al. (p. 5) say their paper "makes the deliberate choice 
of excluding pensions from the main analysis, as their intertemporal nature, and the mix of pay-as-
you-go and fully funded systems, makes it difficult to assess their redistributive nature." In contrast, 
OECD (2008 and 2010) and Goñi et al. (2011) include social security pensions in government 
transfers.
12Although treatment of pay-as-you-go contributory pensions in incidence analysis varies, 
strictly speaking, one should take into account the life-long contributions and benefits of the 
participants to estimate the ―true‖ redistributive component. Pay-as-you-go systems tend to show 
―solidarity‖ in that the pensions of high-income people are usually capped (and thus what they 
receive is below their contribution for a large number of them) while low-income eligible individuals 
tend to receive more than what they contributed.
13Measuring the redistributive impact of social 
security pensions accurately is very complex.  However, our view is that including them in full with 
the rest of the government transfers grossly distorts results by making social spending look much 
more regressive than it is. In this study we decided to follow the same approach as the 
―Microsimulation‖ project and included contributory pensions in market income. 
If the social security system (pensions component) showed a deficit in the year of the survey, 
we called that the ―subsidized portion of social security pensions‖ and we presented some estimates 
of the incidence of this component whenever relevant. Mexico and Peru had a deficit in the year of 
the survey.
14 Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil did not. Although Argentina has a pay-as-you-go system, 
there was no deficit in 2009 (i.e., contributions to the system exceeded payments). Although the 
―Pension Moratorium‖ is administered by the formal social security entity, strictly speaking these 
pensions are non-contributory by definition.
15 In Bolivia, due to the Reforma del Estado (the pay-as-
you-go system was abolished in 1996) there were essentially no contributions to the system in 2007, 
and thus the system effectively functioned as a non-contributory system. In Brazil, while total 
payments from the entire system exceeded contributions, benefits paid to social security (―regular‖ 
pensions for the elderly and disabled) did not. In the latter case, ―special circumstances pensions‖, 
which are intended to smooth idiosyncratic shocks such as hospitalization, loss of wages due to an 
accident at work, or the death of a spouse, are considered to be (100% subsidized) direct 
government transfers, while the benefits paid to the remaining ―regular‖ pensions amounted to less 
than contributions to the system. 
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as an intertemporal transfer for an individual rather than as an intergenerational transfer at a point in time, the beneﬁts of each  
household should be treated as deferred consumption.‖ 
13 Of course, this depends on life expectancy as well. If the rich live longer than the poor, the redistribution is mitigated. 
14We included a separate incidence analysis of the subsidized portion for Mexico and Peru. 
15 See Table 9 for details on the ―Pension Moratorium‖ program. 9 
 
ii. Progressive and Regressive Revenues and Spending: Definitions 
Given that there is no unique convention in the definition of progressivity and regressivity as 
it relates to taxes and transfers, we also present the definitions used here in order to avoid 
ambiguities. Progressivity can be measured in absolute terms: i.e., by comparing transfers/taxes per 
capita among quantiles; or in relative terms: i.e., by comparing transfers/taxes as a share of each 
quantile’s income.   
A convention often followed in the literature is to call transfers progressive when they are 
progressive in absolute terms and to call taxes progressive when they are progressive in relative 
terms.
16This is a bit strange as it leaves us with different criteria for taxes and transfers; how would 
we use the terminology in the case of net transfers? Here, we shall call net transfers progressive 
(regressive) if the post-taxes and transfers distribution of income is more (less) equal than the market 
income distribution.   
On an individual basis, transfers will be progressive in absolute terms when their per capita value 
declines with market income.  The corresponding concentration coefficients are negative. The latter 
is very typical of, for example, conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) (such as Asignacion 
Universal por Hijo (AUH) in Argentina, Bono Juancito Pinto in Bolivia, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, 
Oportunidades in Mexico and Juntos in Peru) and public spending on primary education, as well as 
other social assistance programs targeted to the poor. Transfers will be progressive in relative terms when 
while their per capita value increases with market income, their relative value with respect to market 
income declines. The concentration coefficient is positive but smaller than the market income Gini. 
The latter is very typical of general price subsidies (including VAT exemptions on food as in Mexico, 
for example) and public spending on tertiary education. A transfer that implies the same benefit in 
per capita terms (in proportion to market income) for everyone is neutral in absolute (relative) terms. 
The concentration coefficient is zero (equal to the market income Gini coefficient). An example of a 
transfer that is neutral in absolute terms is Bolivia’s Bonosol, the non-contributory pension established 
from privatization proceeds.
17Of course, it is better (for equality, that is) if a transfer is progressive 
or neutral in absolute (as opposed to relative) terms.  Transfers will be regressive when their relative 
value with respect to market income goes up.  The corresponding concentration coefficient is 
positive and higher than the market income Gini. Regressive transfers are uncommon or nonexistent 
within social spending.  However, subsidies to certain industries and producers as well as 
consumption subsidies on items purchased primarily by the non-poor have been found to be 
regressive.
18For a graphical description of this classification see Diagram 2. 
Taxes will be progressive in absolute terms when their per capita value increases with market 
income. However, practically all existing taxes (except for a poll tax; i.e., everyone pays the same 
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relative (absolute) terms, but the converse is not true. If a tax is progressive (regressive) in relative (absolute) terms, it follows by 
definition that it must be progressive (regressive) in absolute (relative) terms. However, the converse is not true. 10 
 
amount of the tax) are progressive in absolute terms.  Thus, we are interested in relative 
progressivity: taxes (and social security contributions)will be progressive in relative terms when not only 
their per capita value rises with market income but when their relative value with respect to market 
income does too.  For purposes of the analysis, we will call this tax progressive and omit the qualifier 
since it is really unnecessary. The majority of income tax systems (on paper but not necessarily in 
practice) have this characteristic. A tax will be regressive whenever its relative value with respect to 
market income declines as income rises. Value Added Taxes (VAT) are broadly regressive. A flat tax 
in absolute terms (a poll tax) is regressive. An example of this is the implicit tax paid by Mexican 
citizens if we assume each person is entitled to his/her per capita share of the revenues of PEMEX, 
the state-owned oil company. When everybody pays the same tax rate in proportion to their income, 
the tax is called neutral. For a graphical description see Diagram 2. 
 
Diagram 2 - Concentration Curves for Progressive and Regressive Transfers (Taxes) 
 
iii. Allocating Taxes and Transfers at the Household Level 
 
  As mentioned above, unfortunately the information on direct and indirect taxes, transfers in 
cash and in-kind and subsidies cannot always be obtained directly from household surveys.  When it 11 
 
can be obtained, we call this the Direct Identification Method.  When the direct method is not feasible, 
one can use the inference, simulation or imputation methods (described in more detail below). As a 
last resort, one can use secondary sources.  Finally, if none of the options exist, the analysis for that 
category will have to be left blank. 
 
Direct Identification Method 
On some surveys, questions specifically ask if households received benefits from (paid taxes to) 
certain social programs (tax and social security systems), and how much they received (paid). When 
this is the case, it is easy to identify transfer recipients and taxpayers, and add or remove the value of 
the transfers and taxes from their income, depending on the definition of income being used. 
 
Inference Method 
Unfortunately, not all surveys have the information necessary to use the direct identification 
method. In some cases, transfers from social programs are grouped with other income sources (in a 
category for ―other income,‖ for example). In this case, it might be possible to infer which families 
received a transfer based on whether the value they report in that income category matches a 
possible value of the transfer in question. 
 
Simulation Method 
In the case that neither the direct identification nor the inference method can be used, transfer 
benefits can sometimes be simulated, determining beneficiaries (taxpayers) and benefits received 
(taxes paid) based on the program (tax) rules. For example, in the case of a conditional cash transfer 
that uses a proxy means test to identify eligible beneficiaries, one can replicate the proxy means test 
using survey data, identify eligible families, and simulate the program’s impact. However, this 
method gives an upper bound, as it assumes perfect targeting and no errors of inclusion or 
exclusion. In the case of taxes, estimates usually try to make assumptions about evasion.  
 
Imputation Method 
The imputation method is a mix between the direct identification and simulation methods; it uses 
some information from the survey, such as the respondent reporting attending public school or 
receiving a direct transfer in a survey that does not ask for the amount received, and some 
information from either public accounts, such as per capita public expenditure on education by level, 
or from the program rules. 
 
The four methods described above rely on at least some information directly from the household 
survey being used for the analysis. As a result, some households receive benefits, while others do 
not, which is an accurate reflection of reality. However, in some cases the household survey analyzed 





When the survey lacks the necessary questions, such as a question on the use of health services or 
health insurance coverage (necessary to impute the value of in-kind health benefits to households), 
an alternate survey may be used by the author to determine the distribution of benefits. In the 
alternate survey, any of the four methods above could be used to identify beneficiaries and assign 
benefits. Then, the distribution of benefits according to the alternate survey is used to impute 
benefits to all households in the primary survey analyzed; the size of each household’s benefits 
depends on the quantile to which the household belongs. Note that this method is more accurate 
than the secondary sources method below, because although the alternate survey is somewhat of a 
―secondary source,‖ the precise definitions of income and benefits used in CEQ can be applied to 
the alternate survey. 
 
Secondary Sources Method 
When none of the above methods are possible, secondary sources that provide the distribution of 
benefits (taxes) by quantile may be used. These benefits (taxes) are then imputed to all households in 
the survey being analyzed; the size of each household’s benefits (taxes) depends on the quantile to 
which the household belongs. 
 
The method used by each country and for each component of fiscal policy is mentioned in Table 3 
under the corresponding column.
19 
 
iv. Measuring Redistributive Effectiveness 
 
The Effectiveness Indicator is defined as the redistributive effect of the taxes or transfers being 
analyzed divided by their relative size. Specifically, it is defined as follows.  For the net market 
income Gini, it is the fall between the market income and net market income Gini as a percent of 
the market income Gini, divided by the size of direct taxes and employee contributions to social 
security as a percent of GDP. A negative sign means that direct taxes and/or employee 
contributions increased inequality. For the disposable income Gini and headcount index, it is the fall 
between the net market income and disposable income Gini/headcount index as a percent of the 
net market income Gini/headcount index, divided by the size of direct transfers as a percent of 
GDP. For the final income* Gini, it is the fall between the net market income and final income* 
Gini as a percent of the final income* Gini, divided by the size of the sum of direct transfers, 
education spending, health spending, and (where it was included in the analysis) housing and urban 
spending, as a percent of GDP. 
 
  v. Data 
 
                                                           
19 For more details on the methodology used by each country for each component of fiscal policy, see the ―Country 
Information‖ table in the Statistical Annex which is available upon request.  13 
 
The data on household incomes, taxes and transfers comes from the following surveys: 
Argentina: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 1st semester of 2009; Bolivia: Encuesta de Hogares, 
2007; Brazil: Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares, 2008-2009; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso 
y Gasto de los Hogares, 2008; Peru: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, 2009.
20When household surveys 
did not include questions on certain items, the values were imputed following the methodology 
described above (and summarized in Table 3 and Appendix A).  Data on government revenues and 
spending come from the country’s National Accounts (details in Appendix B). 
 
3.  Fiscal Policy and Income Redistribution in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru: Summary of Findings 
 
In this section we analyze the impact of fiscal policy on inequality and poverty using standard 
incidence analysis. Specifically, we address the following questions: 
1. How much redistribution (inequality and poverty reduction) do the countries accomplish 
through fiscal policy? Does the extent of redistribution and redistributive effectiveness vary 
significantly across countries? 
2. Is the extent of redistribution directly correlated with the size of government, social 
spending and spending on direct transfers as stated by existing research? 
 3. What accounts for ―success‖ in terms of both the extent of redistribution and 
government effectiveness to achieve it? 
4.  Should governments collect more revenues, spend more or spend more progressively to 
increase redistribution and improve effectiveness? 
Our main results are presented in Tables 1 through 9 and Figure 1.  Table 1 includes the 
summary indicators for ―pre-fisc‖ and ―post-fisc‖ inequality and poverty (measured by the Gini 
coefficient and headcount ratio, respectively), indicators of the size of government and indicators of 
redistributive effectiveness.
21 Table 2 summarizes the additional fiscal effort that would be required 
to eradicate extreme and moderate poverty (income poverty, human capital poverty and overall 
poverty).
22  Table 3 presents the incidence of taxes and transfers by decile (quintile in the case of 
Argentina). Table 4 presents the concentration shares of taxes and transfers by decile. Table 5 and 
Figure 1 show the concentration coefficients and budget shares by individual (principally social) 
spending items and social spending as a whole. Table 6 includes a brief description of the programs 
                                                           
20 For more details on the household surveys see the ―Country Information‖ table in the Statistical Annex which is 
available upon request. 
21 More detailed information on each country’s public accounts can be found in Appendix B.  
22 For details on how the human capital poverty gaps are calculated see Lustig (2011) and Pessino (2010), Scott (2010), 
Gray Molina et al. (2011), Jaramillo (2011) and Pereira and Higgins (2011). 14 
 
and interventions included in Table 5 (and Figure 1).  Table 7 classifies government spending by the 
extent of its progressivity. Table 8 has the coverage and leakages for flagship programs described in 
some detail in Table 9. 
As we can see in Table 1, measured by the size of their primary (everything but debt 
servicing) spending as a proportion of GDP, countries differ significantly: Argentina, Bolivia and 
Brazil spend between 36 and 40 percent while Mexico and Peru closer to 20 percent. If you take into 
account non-tax and provincial government revenues, the fiscal space to engage in redistribution can 
be quite large: in Brazil, total government revenues (as a share of GDP) surpass 50 percent while in 
Argentina and Bolivia the figure is close to 40 percent. At the other end of the spectrum are Mexico 
and Peru where total revenues are just over 20 percent of GDP.
23Social spending
24 (as a share of 
GDP) ranges from around 17 percent in Brazil to 5.2 percent in Peru.  Direct cash transfers as a 
share of GDP are different as well:  at the bottom are Mexico and Peru where spending on direct 
transfers is around 0.5 percent  while Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia spend 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 percent of 
GDP, respectively. The much larger size of cash transfers in these countries arises from various 
forms of non-contributory pension programs: the Pension Moratorium (2.3 percent of GDP) in 
Argentina, Special Circumstances Pension (2.3 percent of GDP) in Brazil, and Bono Sol (0.9 percent of 
GDP) and the left-over payments of the pay-as-you-go system which was scrapped in 1996 (3.6 
percent of GDP) in Bolivia. When these items are removed, cash transfers as a share of GDP in 
Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia decline to 0.8, 1.8 and 0.6 percent, respectively.   
The bulk of social spending does not always accrue to the top 20 percent.  In fact, the 
concentration coefficient for Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico is negative indicating that social 
spending is progressive in absolute terms: the bottom 20 percent receives a larger share than the top 
20 percent. For Brazil (when health spending is included) and Peru the concentration coefficient for 
social spending is positive but smaller than the market income Gini indicating that social spending is 
progressive in relative terms. The degree of progressivity of social spending varies across countries.  
In Argentina, the concentration coefficient for social spending is -0.15 while it is around -0.05 in 
Bolivia and Mexico.  For Brazil it is 0.13 when health spending is included and -0.05 without 
health.
25 For Peru, it is 0.15. 
One key result is that income inequality reduction varies a great deal among countries. (Table 
1) Argentina is the ―champion‖ and Peru
26 the least redistributionist state.
27  Taking account of direct 
                                                           
23 The sources for these numbers can be found in Appendix B. 
24 Social spending here includes public spending on education, health and social assistance. It does not include spending 
on contributory pensions except for the ―subsidized‖ portion. The ―subsidy‖ is equal to the deficit of the pay-as-you-go 
pension system in the year of the survey. If the contributory pension system did not have a deficit, the subsidy was taken 
to be equal to zero. 
25 The methodology used to measure the incidence of health spending in Brazil implies that there might be a 
―regressiveness-bias‖ and hence we are reporting both results. 
26 The incidence analysis for Bolivia is based on revenue and spending patterns that were in place in 2007. With the 
introduction of new programs and the increase in coverage of existing ones since then, the results may be different. 
27 The ranking obtained here is the same as in CEPAL (2010), Figure VII.1. 15 
 
taxes and all transfers (cash and in-kind in the form of imputed values for public education and 
health), final income inequality in Argentina measured by the Gini coefficient is 27 percent lower 
than the ―pre-fisc‖ market income inequality (the Gini declines by 13 percentage points).
28(Table 1, 
column 5) In contrast, Bolivia’s Gini declines by 11 percent (6 percentage points) in spite of the fact 
that social spending in Bolivia is roughly the same as in Argentina (about 15 percent of GDP) and 
that Bolivia spends more on direct transfers (5.1 percent of GDP vs. 3.1 percent in Argentina). 
Bolivia spends over ten times more than Peru in direct transfers but the reduction in the disposable 
income Gini is roughly the same in both countries. As would be expected, the redistributive 
effectiveness
29 is also quite different across countries.  Argentina seems to get the most redistribution 
―for the buck‖ spent by the government followed by Mexico and Peru.  Compared to Brazil and 
Bolivia, on average, these three countries are about three times more effective in terms of the 
distributive impact of cash transfers and two times more effective when in-kind transfers are added. 
In terms of effectiveness, Bolivia ranks worst. 
When indirect taxes
30 are factored in, the results follow the expected pattern.  Although the 
post-fiscal (after direct and indirect taxes and transfers – excluding in-kind transfers in education and 
health) Gini is practically equal to the disposable income Gini, a closer examination of the incidence 
of indirect taxes reveals some worrisome traits. In Bolivia and Brazil, households (ranked by per 
capita market income) from the third decile onward become net payers.  In the case of Bolivia 
(Brazil), this means that some of the extreme (moderate) poor are net contributors to the fiscal 
system (the government collects more than it transfers to them in the form of direct transfers and 
indirect subsidies – excluding in-kind transfers in education and health). In Peru and Mexico, 
households become net payers from the fourth decile and the fifth decile onward, respectively.  
Thus, in these two countries neither the extreme nor the moderate poor are net contributors to the 
fiscal system. The relatively less unequalizing incidence of indirect taxes in Mexico and Peru is 
probably due to the VAT exemptions on food because the latter comprises a large share of the 
expenditures among low-income groups. 
Existing studies tend to focus on inequality. However, the question of how much poverty 
reduction is attained through fiscal policy is of equal (if not greater) importance.  Our analysis shows 
that, again, results vary significantly across countries.  Argentina’s fiscal policy reduces extreme 
                                                           
28 The two most important (in terms of progressivity and budget share) public spending items for disposable income 
redistribution are the moratorium pension and the CCT Asignacion Universal por Hijo (AUH).  Neither was captured in the 
surveys. The first one was estimated using the inference method and the latter was simulated. Hence, the results should 
be treated as an upper bound. Preliminary results with the 2010 survey, however, indicate that the simulation of AUH 
used here is quite accurate when compared to actual (survey-based) results. 
29The Effectiveness Indicator is defined as the redistributive effect of the taxes or transfers being analyzed divided by 
their relative size with respect to GDP. See section 2.iv. 
30 The impact of indirect taxes comes from secondary courses in general so the quantitative results should be viewed 
with caution. Qualitative results, however, may be robust. 16 
 
poverty
31 the most both in relative and absolute terms. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru, the 
―pre-fisc‖ headcount ratio for extreme poverty is between 13 and 15 percent.  Direct cash transfers 
in Argentina reduce extreme poverty by a staggering 63 percent; after direct transfers and taxes 
extreme poverty in Argentina is as low as 5 percent (headcount ratio). At the other end of the 
spectrum is Peru where direct transfers
32 reduce extreme poverty by only 8 percent.  Bolivia is 
second to last. Brazil and Mexico are in between: disposable income (that is, after direct net transfers) 
poverty is roughly 22 percent lower than market income extreme poverty.  However, because Mexico’s 
and Peru’s direct transfers are better targeted than those in Argentina, the poverty reduction effectiveness is 
highest in Mexico followed by Peru.  By this measure, Argentina ranks third, and Brazil and Bolivia 
rank worst. Brazil has roughly the same headcount ratio as Mexico for ―pre-fisc‖ extreme poverty 
(15.6 and 13.5 percent, respectively).  While Brazil spends about eight times more on direct cash 
transfers (as a share of GDP) than Mexico, fiscal policy reduces extreme poverty by 22 percent in 
both countries. 
In sum, if we classify countries by the size of government, we end up with two distinct 
categories: large government countries (Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil) and small government 
countries (Mexico and Peru).  In terms of redistribution, each country represents a ―prototype.‖  
The ―Argentine prototype‖: a country with very high government spending which redistributes a 
great deal both in absolute terms and in relation to what it spends. The ―Brazilian prototype‖:  a 
country with very high government spending which achieves moderate redistribution in absolute 
terms but not in relation to what it spends. The ―Bolivian prototype‖: a country with very high 
government spending which redistributes little both in absolute terms and in relation to what it 
spends. The ―Mexican model‖: a country with low government spending which achieves moderate 
redistribution in absolute terms and in relation to what it spends. The ―Peruvian prototype‖: a 
country with low government spending which redistributes little in absolute terms but not in relation 
to what it spends. (Table 1, columns 10 and 11). 
Thus, there is no obvious (positive) correlation between government size and redistribution. In 
fact, large government countries can achieve much less redistribution than small government 
countries (e.g., Bolivia (large government) vs. Mexico (small government)), and governments of 
vastly different size can achieve similar reductions in income inequality and poverty (Brazil (large 
government) and Mexico (small government), for example). Social spending and spending on direct 
transfers are not correlated with the extent of redistribution either.  
Based on our results, it would seem that a high share of spending on direct transfers that are 
progressive in absolute terms leads to the greatest success both in terms of the absolute size of 
inequality and poverty reduction and the effectiveness of government to achieve it.  This is the case 
for Argentina.  Sixty percent of the country’s social spending (education, health, social assistance and 
                                                           
31 Extreme poverty is measured using the international PPP US$2.50 a day poverty line which for Latin America 
corresponds to roughly the median of national extreme poverty lines. 
32 In Peru, direct transfers include an important share of transfers in-kind in the form of targeted subsidies for food. 17 
 
the subsidized portion of social security pensions, the latter of which was nonexistent in Argentina 
in 2009) is allocated to programs which are progressive in absolute terms (have a negative 
concentration coefficient). (Tables 7 and 5) The largest items within social spending that are 
progressive in absolute terms are the following: Primary and Secondary Education (27.8 percent of 
social spending), Moratorium Pensions (14.7 percent), Primary Health (14.6 percent) and targeted 
anti-poverty programs (4.6 percent) of which Asignacion Universal por Hijo (AUH) – the CCT 
launched in 2009 – accounts for 2.9 percent. (See Table 9 for a description of AUH and the other 
direct transfers programs).
33 Another dimension of Argentina’s success at widespread redistribution 
is that the proportion of the poor that are covered by at least one direct transfers program is very 
large: 83.3 percent of the extreme poor (households with per capita market income below PPP 
US$2.50/day) and 75.6 percent of the total poor (households with per capita market income below 
PPP US$4/day). (Table 8)  The problem for Argentina is that its spending policies (not just social 
but including myriad of subsidies to productive sectors) might not be macro-economically 
sustainable. 
On the other end of the spectrum is Bolivia, another large government country. Bolivia 
(together with Peru) ranks among the last in terms of inequality and poverty reduction in absolute 
terms; it ranks the worst in terms of effectiveness. (Table 1) In Bolivia, only 32 percent of its social 
spending is progressive in absolute terms (compared to twice that in Argentina and Mexico) and 68 
percent is progressive in only relative terms.  (Table 7) Non-contributory pensions (the left-over of 
the scrapped pay-as-you-go system and Bonosol) represent a third of social spending and are 
(practically) neutral in absolute terms.  (Table 5) Health and secondary education represent close to 
another third of social spending and are also neutral in absolute terms. Tertiary education (a fifth of 
social spending), while not regressive, is barely progressive in relative terms.  As can be seen in Table 
8, the transfers programs in Bolivia, exclude close to sixty percent of the extreme and total poor. 
Juancito Pinto (see description in table 9) stands out for the low coverage of the poor: around 80 
percent are not covered by this program and one third of the beneficiaries are non-poor; they 
receive one third of the benefits. (Table 8) It should be mentioned that the analysis presented here 
was made using the characteristics of the programs as they existed in 2007.  Since then, some 
programs were expanded (Juancito Pinto) and some new ones were introduced (Renta Dignidad); the 
redistribution results might have changed as a result but testing this will have to wait until the more 
recent household surveys are released. 
Brazil is a large government country with moderate redistribution (by Latin American standards) 
and relatively low redistributive effectiveness. (Table 1) Because the incidence of health spending 
comes from secondary sources, the distribution of social spending by degree of progressivity is 
presented with and without health. (Table 7) As one can see, the upper bound estimate (without 
health) of social spending that is progressive in absolute terms is 10 percentage points lower than 
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Argentina’s and Peru’s, and 20 percentage points lower than Mexico’s. If health spending is 
included, the results for Brazil are very similar to Bolivia’s. (Table 7)  The single most important 
spending items that account for Brazil’s relative lack of progressivity in its social spending are the 
special pensions program and public spending on tertiary education, which represent 13.4 and 4.8 percent 
of social spending, respectively. (Table 5) (Health spending represents 24 percent of social 
spending.)  As can be seen in Table 8, coverage of the extreme poor by cash transfers is almost 70 
percent.  This is much larger than Bolivia’s coverage and ten percentage points lower than 
Argentina’s.  Bolsa Familia’s covers about 55 percent of the extreme poor, however.  Thus, in spite of 
its large scale (more than 12 million households according to official records are beneficiaries), a 
large share of the extreme poor are excluded according to the 2009 household survey. While 
household survey may under-estimate the ―true‖ coverage, this result suggests that in order to 
achieve more extreme poverty reduction, Bolsa Familia should be expanded to include many more of 
the extreme poor.  The bulk of benefits (more than 80 percent) of special pensions accrues to the 
nonpoor and 71 percent of the beneficiaries are nonpoor.  (Table 8) Whether the government could 
reduce spending on special pensions (by reducing its coverage and/or amounts per beneficiary) and 
use it for the expansion of Bolsa Familia remains to be seen.  Before cutting spending on social 
programs that are progressive in relative terms, the government should analyze if cuts can be made 
in nonsocial spending first.  
Mexico and Peru are small government countries but Mexico is more redistributive (especially in 
terms of extreme poverty reduction) and it is also more effective at poverty reduction than Peru. 
(Table 1) Mexico is able to reduce extreme poverty by similar rates as Brazil, although it spends 
(considerably) less on cash transfers.
34 (Table 1)  In fact, in terms of poverty reduction effectiveness, 
Mexico ranks first and second (after Argentina) in terms of inequality reduction effectiveness. (Table 
1, columns 10 and 11) What accounts for Mexico’s ―success‖? One obvious answer is that it 
allocates the highest share of social spending (around 70 percent) to programs that are progressive in 
absolute terms (of the five countries analyzed here). (Table 7)  Around 8 percent of social spending 
goes to cash transfers programs which are progressive in absolute terms. (Table 5, Figure 1 and 
Table 6) Mexico allocates fifty percent more to targeted cash transfers as a share of GDP than Peru. 
(Table 1) And, since Mexico’s GDP/capita is higher than Peru’s, the higher proportion of targeted 
transfers translates into even more resources per poor person transferred to the extreme poor.  
Thus, Mexico is quite successful in channeling its social spending disproportionately to the poor.  
However, because the amounts spent are small, extreme poverty rates are still quite high, especially 
when compared with poverty reduction in Argentina.  The share of transfers accruing to the extreme 
poor (those earning less than PPP US$2.50 a day) is roughly the same in Argentina and Mexico 
(Table 8), but this translates into smaller per beneficiary amounts. In addition, the percentage of 
extreme poor excluded from the safety net system is about one third.  Mexico is a clear case in 
which the government should spend more on cash transfers programs targeted to the poor both to 
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expand their coverage and, depending on the program, increase the size per beneficiary.  While the 
resources can be obtained from redistribution, given the size of government, Mexico has wiggle 
room to increase revenues.  With perfect targeting, eliminating the 2009 extreme poverty gap would 
require to spend (and collect) additional resources of around 0.2 percent of GDP. 
Peru is a small government country that redistributes very little. (Table 1) As mentioned above, 
Peru’s ranking in terms of inequality and poverty reduction in absolute terms is the lowest (together 
with Bolivia’s).  However, per amount spent as a proportion of GDP (effectiveness indicator), Peru 
does better than Brazil and Bolivia, and in the case of extreme poverty reduction, also better than 
Argentina.  Peru appears to be the only country of the five that fits the ―conventional wisdom.‖ 
Peru accomplishes little redistribution because its revenues and social spending are low.  Social 
spending is also quite less progressive than in the other countries. Targeted transfers are quite 
progressive (Juntos and food transfers), but they are very small. (Tables 1, 5 and 6; Figure 1) 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Does Latin America redistribute relatively little? Based on our results, the answer is still a ―yes‖ 
especially when compared with the advanced countries in Western Europe.  The size of 
redistribution found here, however, is a bit higher than in previous studies. All in all, fiscal policy 
reduces market income Gini (when compared with disposable income Gini) by between 1.2 
percentage points in Peru and 4.8 percentage points in Argentina.  This redistributive improvement 
may be the result of the introduction of large-scale cash transfers targeted to the poor, the most 
important innovation in social policy of the last fifteen years. When in-kind transfers (imputed 
values for public education and health) are included in the calculation, fiscal policy reduces market 
(net market in the cases of Argentina and Mexico) income Gini (when compared with final 
income*)
35 by between 3.2 percentage points in Peru and 12.8 percentage points in Argentina.
36 
 
Does Latin America redistributive relatively little because government revenues are low and 
government spending is not only low but insufficiently progressive?  Does social spending tend to 
accrue to the richest quintile? Are direct cash transfers – even if progressive – too small?  Our 
analysis shows that we cannot arrive at the sort of broad conclusions that previous studies seem to 
imply.   
 
First, we found that neither the extent of redistribution nor government’s effectiveness is 
(positively) correlated with the size of government or social spending. Bolivia, a large government 
country, achieves much less redistribution than Mexico, a small government country.  Meanwhile 
                                                           
35 For the definition see section 2 and Chart 1. 
36 Since the incidence of indirect taxes comes mainly from secondary sources, and Argentina does not report them, we 
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Argentina, another large government country, is the most redistributionist state. Brazil, whose 
primary spending as a share of GDP is twice as large as Mexico’s achieves roughly the same 
reduction in extreme poverty as the latter. Social spending and spending on direct transfers are not 
correlated with the extent of redistribution either. For example, Bolivia spends over ten times more 
than Peru spends in direct transfers but the reduction in market income Gini (when compared with 
disposable income Gini) is roughly the same in both countries.  Redistributive effectiveness is not 
correlated with government size either. Argentina – a large government country – ranks among the 
first in terms of redistributive effectiveness (the amount of inequality and poverty reduction 
obtained per amount spent as a proportion of GDP).  Mexico and Peru – two small government 
countries – are also ranked at the top in terms of redistributive effectiveness.   
 
Second, the degree of progressivity of social spending also varies across countries.  In Argentina 
social spending is quite progressive in absolute terms and in Bolivia and Mexico, it is mildly 
progressive in absolute terms. In Brazil and Peru, it is progressive but in relative terms only meaning 
that a larger share of social spending accrues to the top deciles.   
 
Third, we found that cash transfers in Bolivia are large and not very progressive.  In Argentina, 
cash transfers are not small and are quite progressive.  The only country that seems to fit what we 
called here the ―conventional wisdom‖ is Peru. In Peru, redistribution is very limited because 
revenues and spending are low, social spending is not sufficiently progressive and cash transfers are 
very progressive but also very small. 
 
As expected, our results indicate that a high share of spending on direct (and in-kind) transfers 
that are progressive in absolute terms leads to the greatest success both in terms of the size of 
inequality and poverty reduction (in percent or percentage points, for example) and the effectiveness 
of government to achieve it (the extent of reduction per peso spent on transfers, for example).  In 
our sample, this is the case of Argentina. However, Argentina (along with Bolivia and Brazil) may be 
on a fiscally unsustainable path. In these three countries, fiscal redistribution might be highly 
dependent on exceptionally benign macroeconomic conditions, especially very favorable terms of 
trade.  For redistribution to become sustainable, these countries will have to find ways to both cut 
spending and make the collection of taxes and allocation of spending more progressive.  Bolivia will 
have to change the design of its safety net system which, as of 2007, achieved very little 
redistribution.  
On the other side of the spectrum are Mexico and Peru – small government countries. In the 
cases of Mexico and, above all, Peru, the smallness of the government translates into a certain 
degree of ―stinginess‖ in terms of the safety net available to the extreme poor. In order to attain 
more redistribution, Mexico and Peru will have to raise more revenues (though by a relatively small 
amount) and/or devote the additional resources to social spending and, in particular, direct transfers 21 
 
targeted to the poor (increase the coverage among the extreme poor and raise the benefits per poor 
person).   
All five countries spend on interventions outside social spending such as, for example, tax 
expenditures and subsidies to producers in agriculture, industry and services.  There is evidence that 
the bulk of this spending is definitely not progressive in absolute terms (although it is in relative 
terms) and some of it might be regressive (as shown, for example, for the cases of Argentina and 
Mexico in Table 7).  Spending that is regressive should be scrapped. Spending that is progressive in 
relative terms should be made more progressive. One caveat is in order, however: regressive or 
relatively progressive spending may still imply important sources of fiscal ―revenue‖ (in the form of 
lower prices for consumption items, for example) for the poorest deciles.  They should not be 
scrapped or modified without the poor being compensated for their losses.  Otherwise, a fiscal 
policy’s redistributive effectiveness may improve, but at the cost of higher poverty. 
Finally, as shown above, indirect taxes can turn the extreme poor (Bolivia) or moderate poor 
(Brazil) into net contributors to the fiscal system (the government collects more from them than it 
transfers to them in the form of direct transfers and indirect subsidies– excluding in-kind transfers in 
education and health).  This calls for an assessment of current direct and indirect taxes as the poor 
should not come out as net contributors to the fiscal system, especially when there is space to 
distribute the tax burden and public spending in more equitable ways. 
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         1  1                  
Effect ind  --  -0.02  3.33  --  2.02  --           1  1                   
HI $4 PPP  N/Av  24.9%  15.7% 
Not applicable 
1  1                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -36.9%           1                     
Effect ind  --  --  11.99           2                      
HI $2.5 PPP  N/Av  14.7%  5.4%  2  1                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -63.3%           1                     









Gini  0.550  0.550  0.537  0.533  0.490  0.501  4  4  4        $4,069  40.60%  5.10%  4.30%  31.80%  -0.05 
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -2.4%  -3.1%  -10.9%  -9.0%           5  4  5  1  1  5  5  2-4 (tie) 
Effect ind  --  0.00  0.48  --  0.73  --           5  5                   
HI $4 PPP  43.2%  43.2%  40.6% 
Not applicable 
5  5                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -6.0%           4                     
Effect ind  --  --  1.18           5                      
HI$2.5 PPP  25.9%  25.9%  23.4%  5  5                           
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -9.6%           4                     








Gini  0.572  0.560  0.546  0.545  0.504  0.499  5  5  5        $10,140  36.90%  4.10%  1.10%  52.60%  -0.05 
% mket inc  --  -2.1%  -4.5%  -4.7%  -11.9%  -12.8%           2  3  3  2  2  3  3  2-4 (tie) 
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -2.5%  -2.7%  -10.0%  -11.0%           2  3                0.13 
Effect ind  --  0.17  0.60  --  0.83  --           4  4                 5 
HI $4 PPP  26.6%  27.3%  24.2% 
Not applicable 
3  3                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -11.4%           2                     
Effect ind  --  --  2.75           4                      
HI $2.5 PPP  15.3%  15.6%  12.2%  4  3                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -22.2%           3                     






Table 1.Gini, Headcount Ratio, Redistributive Effectiveness and Rankings by Country Cont. (cont.) 
 
 








Gini  0.511  0.502  0.493  0.487  0.437  0.433  3  3  2        $14,530  21.90%  0.60%  0.90%  56.70%  -0.05 
% mket inc  --  -1.9%  -3.6%  -4.6%  -14.5%  -15.2%           3  2  1  4  4  2  2  2-4 (tie) 
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -1.8%  -2.8%  -12.9%  -13.6%           3  2                  
Effect ind  --  0.73  2.88  --  1.56  --           2  2                   
HI $4 PPP  N/Av  26.4%  23.5% 
Not applicable 
2  2                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -10.9%           3                     
Effect ind  --  --  17.87           1                      
HI $2.5 PPP  N/Av  13.5%  10.4%  1  2                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -22.8%           2                     






Gini  0.504  0.495  0.492  0.490  0.472  0.470  2  2  3        $8,349  18.90%  0.40%  2.80%  45.50%  -0.04 
% mket inc  --  -1.7%  -2.5%  -2.8%  -6.3%  -6.6%           4  5  4  5  5  4  4  5 
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -0.8%  -1.1%  -4.6%  -5.0%           4  5                  
Effect ind  --  0.30  2.15  --  0.90  --           3  3                   
HI $4 PPP  N/Av  28.8%  28.1% 
Not applicable 
4  4                            
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -2.4%           5                     
Effect ind  --  --  6.71           3                      
HI $2.5 PPP  N/Av  15.1%  13.9%  3  4                           
% net mket 
inc  --  --  -7.9%           5                     
Effect ind  --  --  21.70           2                      
Notes: 
a. On vertical axis, “% mket inc” is an abbreviation for percent change with respect to market income; “% net mkt inc” is an abbreviation for percent change with respect to net market income; “Effect ind” is an abbreviation for the Effectiveness 
Indicator; “HI” is an abbreviation for Headcount index, and is expressed as a percentage. On horizontal axis; *1+ “mket” is an abbreviation for market income; *2+ “net mket” is an abbreviation for net market income; *3+ “disp” is an abbreviation for 
disposable income; *4+ “post-fisc” is an abbreviation for post-fiscal income; *5+ “fin*” is an abbreviation for final income*; *6+ “fin” is an abbreviation for final income; *12+ “GNI/cap” is in PPP for the year of survey using US dollars; *15+ “% increase 
in spending” is for primary spending required to close the $2.50 (extreme poverty) gap; *16+ “% progressive” is for spending in absolute terms; *17+ “Con coeff” is an abbreviation for concentration for social spending. N/Av is an abbreviation for Not 
available. [12]-[17] are ranked from best to worst. 
b. The Effectiveness Indicator is defined as the redistributive effect of the taxes or transfers being analyzed divided by their relative size. Specifically, for the net market income Gini, it is the fall between the market income and net market income 
Gini as a percent of the market income Gini divided by the size of direct taxes and employee contributions to social security as a percent of GDP. For the disposable income Gini and headcount index, it is the fall between the net market income and 
disposable income Gini/headcount index as a percent of the net market income Gini/headcount index, divided by the size of direct transfers as a percent of GDP. For the final income* Gini, it is the fall between the net market income and final 
income* Gini as a percent of the final income* Gini, divided by the size of the sum of direct transfers, education spending, health spending, and (where it was included in the analysis) housing and urban spending, as a percent of GDP. 
c. Not available means that the corresponding figure could not be estimated based on the household survey being used. Not applicable indicates that market income is not applicable in Bolivia because there were negligible or no direct taxes on 
income and contributions to social security in Bolivia in the year of the survey. 
Dark grey shading and the words "not applicable" are used to signify that poverty is not calculated beyond disposable income because the poverty lines are not meant to account for the costs of health, education, etc. 
d. For Argentina the Gini of post-fiscal income could only be calculated by quintile because indirect taxes are imputed based on secondary sources. The Gini calculated by quintile for post-fiscal income (ignoring intra-quintile inequality) is 0.421, 
which is an increase over the disposable-income Gini when it is calculated by quintile, of 0.408. 
e. The % of spending which is progressive in absolute terms in the cases of Brazil, Mexico and Peru includes the subsidized portion of contributory social security pensions; also, in the case of Brazil it corresponds to the figure leaving out health 
spending; with health spending, the number is 29.2%. 
f. Social Spending includes public spending on Education, Health, Social Assistance and the Subsidized Portion of Social Security. 
g. The concentration coefficient excluding CEQ Social Spending is reported excluding health spending for Brazil.  Brazil is the only country studied that does not include a question on its survey regarding use of health services or health coverage. 
Thus a secondary source (IBGE, 2009) was used to determine the distribution of health spending. Unfortunately this source does not break down health spending into sub-categories, some of which would probably be absolutely progressive while 
others would be relatively progressive (as we see in the other countries studied). Given the limitations of our secondary source, all of health spending must be considered relatively progressive. Since health spending is large, this would distort the 
concentration coefficient of CEQ Social Spending. 
h. The Gini reported for Argentina and Mexico ignores intra-decile inequality while the Gini reported for Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru take intra-decile inequality into account. 
i. The surveys used for each country are as follows. Argentina: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 1st semester of 2009; Bolivia: Encuesta de Hogares, 2007; Brazil: Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares, 2008-2009; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional 
de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, 2008; Peru: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, 2009. 27 
 






















Gap in millions of LCU






459,961  0.4%  1.6%  1.4%  2.2%  1.7%  3.8% 
Primary 
Spending
f  430,401  0.4%  1.7%  1.5%  2.3%  1.9%  4.1% 
Gov. 
Revenue
e  359,729  0.5%  2.1%  1.7%  2.8%  2.2%  4.9% 
Bolivia 
Gap in millions of LCU






43,144  4.1%  13.8%  2.4%  4.3%  6.5%  18.1% 
Primary 
Spending
f  41,799  4.3%  14.2%  2.4%  4.4%  6.7%  18.7% 
Gov. 
Revenue
e  44,930  4.0%  13.2%  2.3%  4.1%  6.3%  17.4% 
Brazil 
Gap in millions of LCU






1,629,853  0.8%  2.8%  0.3%  0.4%  1.1%  3.2% 
Primary 
Spending
f  1,173,831  1.1%  3.9%  0.4%  0.6%  1.5%  4.5% 
Gov. 
Revenue
e  2,219,950  0.6%  2.0%  0.2%  0.3%  0.8%  2.4% 
Mexico 
Gap in millions of LCU













2,824,741  0.8%  3.7%  1.1%  2.2%  1.9%  5.9% 
Peru 
Gap in millions of LCU














71,625  2.9%  10.9%  1.2%  3.2%  4.1%  14.1% 
Notes:                                           
a. Assumes additional revenue is allocated to targeted anti-poverty programs with perfect targeting. For the after-transfers income poverty gap, disposable 
income is used 
b. LCU stands for local currency units. Each country's LCU is as follows: Argentina - Argentine peso; Bolivia - boliviano; Brazil - real; Mexico - Mexican peso; 
Peru - nuevo sol. 
c. Disposable income is used to calculate the after transfers income poverty gap. 
d. The gaps for Argentina include the simulated effect of Asignación Universal por Hijo. 
e. Government revenue for Argentina includes federal and provincial tax collection, and does not include municipal revenue or consolidated non-tax 
revenue. Non-tax revenues in the case of Argentina include unorthodox forms of revenue including the use of central bank reserves, pension savings from 
individual accounts after they were nationalized, and inflation tax; thus non-tax revenues are not included here, in contrast with the other countries. 
f. The difference between total spending and primary spending is that total spending includes servicing internal and external debt, while primary spending 
does not. 
 
Shades of grey are used to make it easy to distinguish between spending/revenues (medium grey) and the poverty gaps, and to further distinguish the gaps 
between those using a $2.50 PPP per day poverty line (white) and a $4 PPP per day poverty line (light grey). 




Table 3. Incidence of Taxes and Transfers by Decile a
/ With Respect to Market Income 
b/  



































































Argentina    
Sec  Sec    
  
Inf  DirID  Sim    
  
Sec  Sec    
  
Imp  Imp  Sec    
     
        
Method:                   
Quintiles 
   1  0.0%  0.0%  -12.2%  -12.2%  -12.2%  68.8%  11.3%  13.8%  93.9%  81.7%  28.0%  -45.7% 
-17.7%  64.0% 
93.1%  61.4%  24.0%  178.5%  300.5%  -57.9%  260.3%  242.6%    
   2  0.0%  0.0%  -6.6%  -6.6%  -6.6%  9.4%  2.1%  2.6%  14.0%  7.4%  15.7%  -22.4%  -6.6%  0.8%  29.7%  15.0%  8.7%  53.4%  83.2%  -29.0%  60.8%  54.2%    
   3  0.0%  0.0%  -5.5%  -5.5%  -5.5%  5.1%  0.8%  0.8%  6.7%  1.1%  13.5%  -17.4%  -4.0%  -2.8%  14.4%  5.6%  5.7%  25.7%  45.8%  -22.9%  26.8%  22.9%    
   4  0.0%  0.0%  -4.7%  -4.7%  -4.7%  2.9%  0.2%  0.2%  3.3%  -1.4%  9.2%  -14.3%  -5.0%  -6.4%  6.8%  2.1%  3.7%  12.6%  25.1%  -18.9%  11.2%  6.2%    
   5  0.0%  -2.5%  -3.9%  -6.4%  -6.4%  0.7%  0.1%  0.0%  0.8%  -5.6%  7.5%  -10.7%  -3.2%  -8.8%  2.2%  0.4%  1.7%  4.3%  12.5%  -17.0%  -1.3%  -4.5%    
Total Pop  0.0%  -1.3%  -4.7%  -6.1%  -6.1%  4.4%  0.7%  0.8%  5.8%  -0.3%  9.9%  -14.3%  -4.4%  -4.7%  9.6%  4.3%  3.9%  17.8%  33.5%  -20.4%  17.6%  13.2%    
Bolivia    
        
  
DirID  Sim 
DirID 
and 
Sim    
  
Imp  Sec    
  
Imp  Imp       
     
        
 Method: 
  
              
Deciles 
  1  0.0%              73.9%  48.9%  12.0%  134.8%  134.8%  0.8%  -24.5%  -23.7%  111.1%  93.2%  6.3%     99.5%  235.1%  -24.5%  234.3%  210.6%    
   2  0.0%              8.1%  11.1%  3.8%  23.0%  23.0%  0.5%  -13.0%  -12.5%  10.5%  34.6%  1.8%     36.4%  59.9%  -13.0%  59.4%  46.9%    
   3  0.0%              0.7%  3.8%  2.4%  6.8%  6.8%  0.4%  -11.1%  -10.7%  -3.9%  24.0%  0.8%     24.8%  32.1%  -11.1%  31.7%  21.0%    
   4  0.0%              1.9%  2.7%  1.8%  6.4%  6.4%  0.4%  -11.5%  -11.2%  -4.8%  18.0%  0.7%     18.7%  25.5%  -11.5%  25.1%  14.0%    
   5  0.0%              1.0%  1.6%  1.4%  4.0%  4.0%  0.3%  -11.4%  -11.1%  -7.1%  12.8%  0.5%     13.3%  17.6%  -11.4%  17.3%  6.2%    
   6  0.0%              1.3%  1.2%  0.9%  3.4%  3.4%  0.3%  -11.6%  -11.4%  -7.9%  11.6%  0.4%     12.0%  15.7%  -11.6%  15.4%  4.0%    
   7  0.0%              1.5%  1.3%  0.9%  3.8%  3.8%  0.2%  -11.9%  -11.7%  -8.0%  7.9%  0.3%     8.2%  12.2%  -11.9%  12.0%  0.3%    
   8  0.0%              1.3%  0.8%  0.6%  2.8%  2.8%  0.2%  -12.0%  -11.8%  -9.0%  7.9%  0.3%     8.1%  11.1%  -12.0%  10.9%  -0.9%    
   9  0.0%              1.0%  0.7%  0.5%  2.2%  2.2%  0.1%  -12.0%  -11.8%  -9.6%  4.7%  0.2%     4.9%  7.2%  -12.0%  7.1%  -4.7%    
   10  0.0%              0.6%  0.4%  0.1%  1.1%  1.1%  0.1%  -12.5%  -12.4%  -11.3%  1.6%  0.0%     1.6%  2.8%  -12.5%  2.7%  -9.7%    
Total Pop  0.0%              9.1%  7.3%  2.4%  18.8%  18.8%  0.3%  -13.2%  -12.8%  6.0%  21.6%  1.1%     22.8%  41.9%  -13.2%  41.6%  28.8%    
Brazil    
DirID  DirID 
  
  
DirID  DirID  DirID 
        
Sec 
     
Imp  Sec    
              
  
Method:                                     
Deciles 
  1  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.7%  -0.8%  -0.8%  11.8%  19.7%  36.8%  68.3%  67.5%     -22.2%  -22.2%  45.3%  167.3%  77.9%     245.2%  313.5%  -23.0%  312.7%  290.5%    
   2  0.0%  -0.3%  -1.7%  -2.0%  -2.0%  3.7%  6.3%  13.9%  23.9%  21.9%     -16.3%  -16.3%  5.6%  64.4%  16.9%     81.3%  105.2%  -18.2%  103.2%  86.9%    
   3  0.0%  -0.3%  -2.2%  -2.5%  -2.5%  1.9%  2.8%  9.5%  14.1%  11.6%     -15.3%  -15.3%  -3.7%  37.9%  10.2%     48.1%  62.2%  -17.8%  59.7%  44.4%    
   4  0.0%  -0.4%  -2.6%  -3.0%  -3.0%  1.2%  1.2%  8.1%  10.5%  7.6%     -15.0%  -15.0%  -7.4%  25.2%  7.0%     32.2%  42.7%  -18.0%  39.8%  24.7%    
   5  0.0%  -0.4%  -2.9%  -3.4%  -3.4%  0.7%  0.5%  8.3%  9.6%  6.2%     -15.0%  -15.0%  -8.8%  16.4%  5.3%     21.7%  31.2%  -18.4%  27.9%  12.8%    
   6  0.0%  -0.6%  -3.1%  -3.6%  -3.6%  0.3%  0.2%  6.4%  6.9%  3.3%     -14.9%  -14.9%  -11.6%  11.9%  8.8%     20.7%  27.7%  -18.5%  24.0%  9.1%    
   7  0.0%  -0.7%  -3.2%  -3.9%  -3.9%  0.1%  0.1%  5.0%  5.2%  1.3%     -14.7%  -14.7%  -13.4%  7.9%  11.9%     19.8%  25.0%  -18.5%  21.1%  6.5%    
   8  0.0%  -0.9%  -3.7%  -4.6%  -4.6%  0.1%  0.0%  4.5%  4.6%  0.0%     -14.7%  -14.7%  -14.8%  5.9%  10.5%     16.4%  20.9%  -19.4%  16.3%  1.6%    
   9  0.0%  -1.6%  -4.0%  -5.6%  -5.6%  0.0%  0.0%  3.0%  3.0%  -2.6%     -14.6%  -14.6%  -17.2%  3.4%  13.5%     16.9%  19.9%  -20.2%  14.3%  -0.3%    
   10  0.0%  -5.7%  -3.9%  -9.6%  -9.6%  0.0%  0.0%  2.2%  2.2%  -7.4%     -14.2%  -14.2%  -21.6%  1.3%  7.4%     8.7%  10.9%  -23.8%  1.3%  -12.9%    
Total Pop  0.0%  -3.1%  -3.6%  -6.6%  -6.6%  0.3%  0.4%  4.2%  5.0%  -1.6%     -14.6%  -14.6%  -16.3%  8.3%  9.9%     18.2%  23.2%  -21.2%  16.6%  2.0%    
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Mexico    
Sec  Sec 
         DirID 
and Alt  
Imp 
and Alt  
      Imp 
and Alt  
Sec 
     
Imp  Imp  Imp 
              
Imp 
 Method                                         
Deciles1  0.0%  0.0%  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.4%     21.9%  0.4%  22.3%  21.9%  9.6%  -6.3%  3.3%  25.2%  76.9%  27.7%  0.5%  105.2%  137.1%  -6.7%  127.1%  130.4%  0.1% 
   2  0.0%  0.0%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.5%     7.0%  0.5%  7.5%  7.1%  6.3%  -6.2%  0.1%  7.2%  35.2%  14.9%  0.1%  50.2%  64.0%  -6.7%  57.3%  57.4%  0.4% 
   3  0.0%  0.0%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.5%     3.7%  0.8%  4.5%  4.0%  5.5%  -6.4%  -0.9%  3.1%  24.8%  11.5%  0.1%  36.4%  46.4%  -6.9%  40.4%  39.5%  0.8% 
   4  0.0%  0.0%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.6%     2.1%  0.8%  2.9%  2.3%  4.9%  -6.6%  -1.7%  0.6%  18.1%  9.3%  0.1%  27.5%  35.3%  -7.2%  29.8%  28.1%  1.0% 
   5  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.6%     1.3%  0.9%  2.2%  1.6%  4.9%  -6.8%  -1.9%  -0.3%  14.0%  6.9%  0.1%  20.9%  28.1%  -7.4%  22.5%  20.6%  1.0% 
   6  0.0%  -0.5%  -0.6%  -1.1%  -1.1%     0.9%  0.8%  1.7%  0.6%  4.1%  -6.3%  -2.2%  -1.6%  10.8%  5.9%  0.1%  16.8%  22.6%  -7.4%  17.4%  15.2%  1.3% 
   7  0.0%  -1.3%  -0.6%  -2.0%  -2.0%     0.6%  0.7%  1.3%  -0.6%  4.2%  -6.6%  -2.4%  -3.0%  8.0%  4.9%  0.1%  13.0%  18.5%  -8.6%  12.3%  9.9%  1.5% 
   8  0.0%  -2.2%  -0.6%  -2.9%  -2.9%     0.4%  0.6%  1.0%  -1.9%  3.8%  -6.6%  -2.8%  -4.7%  5.9%  4.0%  0.0%  9.9%  14.7%  -9.5%  8.0%  5.2%  1.9% 
   9  0.0%  -3.7%  -0.7%  -4.3%  -4.3%     0.2%  0.4%  0.6%  -3.7%  3.6%  -6.8%  -3.2%  -6.9%  3.8%  2.8%  0.0%  6.6%  10.9%  -11.1%  2.9%  -0.3%  2.3% 
   10  0.0%  -5.7%  -0.5%  -6.2%  -6.2%     0.2%  0.1%  0.3%  -6.0%  2.3%  -5.8%  -3.5%  -9.5%  1.1%  1.1%  0.0%  2.2%  4.7%  -12.0%  -3.8%  -7.3%  3.0% 
Total Pop  0.0%  -3.3%  -0.6%  -3.9%  -3.9%     0.9%  0.4%  1.4%  -2.5%  3.5%  -6.3%  -2.8%  -5.3%  7.1%  3.9%  0.0%  11.1%  15.9%  -10.2%  8.6%  5.8%  2.2% 
Peru    
DirID  DirID 
        
DirID  DirID 
        
DirID 
     
Imp  DirID 
                 
Imp 
Method:                                              
Deciles 
1  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     6.4%  3.6%  10.0%  10.0%     -0.7%  -0.7%  9.4%  30.9%  5.8%     36.7%  46.7%  -0.7%  46.7%  46.1% 
0.0% 
   2  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     2.0%  1.4%  3.4%  3.4%     -0.6%  -0.6%  2.7%  14.7%  3.4%     18.2%  21.5%  -0.6%  21.5%  20.9%  0.1% 
   3  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.9%  0.9%  1.8%  1.8%     -1.0%  -1.0%  0.8%  10.0%  2.6%     12.6%  14.5%  -1.0%  14.4%  13.5%  0.4% 
   4  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.3%  0.5%  0.9%  0.8%     -1.2%  -1.2%  -0.3%  7.0%  2.5%     9.5%  10.3%  -1.2%  10.3%  9.2%  0.5% 
   5  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.2%  0.3%  0.5%  0.4%     -1.3%  -1.3%  -0.9%  5.1%  2.5%     7.6%  8.1%  -1.4%  8.0%  6.7%  0.8% 
   6  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%     0.0%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%     -1.6%  -1.6%  -1.4%  3.5%  1.9%     5.4%  5.6%  -1.6%  5.6%  4.0%  1.1% 
   7  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%     0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.0%     -1.7%  -1.7%  -1.7%  2.4%  1.9%     4.3%  4.4%  -1.8%  4.3%  2.6%  1.2% 
   8  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%     0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.0%     -1.7%  -1.7%  -1.7%  1.8%  2.0%     3.8%  3.9%  -1.8%  3.8%  2.1%  1.7% 
   9  0.0%  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2%     0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%     -1.9%  -1.9%  -2.1%  1.1%  1.8%     2.9%  2.9%  -2.1%  2.7%  0.8%  1.9% 
   10  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.3%     0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -0.3%     -2.0%  -2.0%  -2.3%  0.3%  1.3%     1.5%  1.6%  -2.3%  1.2%  -0.7%  1.8% 
Total Pop  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.2%     0.2%  0.2%  0.4%  0.2%     -1.7%  -1.7%  -1.5%  2.6%  1.8%     4.4%  4.8%  -1.9%  4.6%  2.9%  1.5% 
Notes: 
“Empl Contr SS” represents Employee Contributions to Social Security; “All taxes” contains Direct and Indirect, including contributions to Social Security; “Subs Contr Pens” represents Subsidized Portion of 
Contributory Pensions. Where it occurs, “Mkt” stands for market; “Disp” stands for disposable; “Inc” stands for income; “Dir” stands for direct; “Indir” stands for indirect; “Pens” stands for pensions; “Trans” stands 
for transfers; “Subs” stands for subsidies. “Alt” is an abbreviation for Alternate Survey. “DirID” is an abbreviation for Direct Identification. “Imp” is an abbreviation for Imputation Method. “Inf” is an abbreviation 
for inference method. “Sec” is an abbreviation for Secondary Sources. “”Sim” is an abbreviation of Simulation Method. “Trans” is an abbreviation for Transfers. “Educ” is an abbreviation for education 
a. For Argentina the distribution is given by quintile because some categories use secondary sources that provide the distribution by quintile only. 
b. For Bolivia it is with respect to net market income rather than market income because market income is not available. However, there are no direct taxes applied to personal income in Bolivia so net market 
income is comparable to market income. 
c. For Bolivia there are no direct taxes applied to personal income. For the countries using secondary sources for direct taxes, Argentina includes partial general equilibrium effects in the analysis; Mexico does not. 
d. For Brazil, this category also includes deductions identified as "other deductions" (not "income tax" or "contributions to social security"). 
e. For Argentina, non-contributory pensions are the moratorium pensions. For Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru, non-contributory pensions are grouped with targeted transfers, thus this column is left blank. For Brazil, 
non-contributory pensions are Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC). 
f. For Argentina, targeted monetary transfers include Jefes y Jefas de Hogar, Familias, Becas, and unemployment insurance. For Bolivia, the column includes Bono Juancito Pinto, maternity subsidy, Beneméritos de 
la Patria and non-contributory pensions (Sistema de Reparto Residual). For Brazil, the column includes only Bolsa Família; other targeted monetary transfers are incorporated in the column "other direct transfers". 
For Mexico, the column includes Oportunidades, Adultos Mayores (non-contributory pensions), Procampo, Becas, and other social programs. For Peru, it includes Juntos. 
g. For Argentina, other direct transfers is Asignación Universal por Hijo, which was not captured by the survey (it was implemented later in 2009) but is simulated according to the program rules, assuming perfect 
coverage and targeting. For Bolivia, the column includes food programs as Lactation Subsidy and Desayuno Escolar. For Brazil, it includes Programs Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), Bolsa Escola, other 
scholarships, special-circumstances pensions, unemployment benefits, minimum-income programs, Abono do PIS/PASEP, Auxílio-Gás, and other government auxílios. For Mexico, it includes opciones productivas, 
employment subsidies, and agricultural subsidies. For Peru, it includes food transfers, mainly from the programs Programa Integral de Nutrición, Programa de Complementación Alimentaria, and Vaso de Leche. 
h. For all countries, indirect taxes were imputed using effective rates by quantile from secondary sources. For Brazil, the secondary source incorporates multisectoral effects, cumulatively and the evasion of 
indirect taxes, based on an input-output matrix for Brazil. The matrix reports total indirect taxes net of indirect subsidies as well as the effects of the direct and indirect taxation of inputs. 
i. It is assumed that the distribution of the subsidized portion of pensions is the same as the distribution of pensions themselves. For Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil there was no social security deficit in the year of 
the survey; thus the subsidized portion of social security was effectively zero. 
j. For Bolivia, indirect subsidies includes only Subsidio al Gas Licuado (GLP). For Brazil, the column indirect taxes accounts for indirect subsidies and is the net effect, so this column is left blank. 
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Table 4. Concentration Shares of Income, Taxes and Transfers 


































































1  0.6%  0.0%  3.0%  2.3%  0.5%  35.3%  24.7%  24.6%  32.7%  2.4% 
7.8% 
3.8% 
8.6%  4.5% 
11.7%  18.6% 
17.0%  27.6%  24.7% 
2.9%  3.8% 
 
N/A 
  2  2.2%  0.0%  4.1%  3.2%  2.1%  8.2%  22.1%  26.6%  12.2%  2.7%  4.5%  15.0%  20.5%  3.7%  4.4%     N/A 
  3  3.4%  0.0%  5.2%  4.1%  3.4%  9.2%  14.7%  15.9%  10.7%  3.8% 
12.9% 
5.4% 
11.1%  8.4% 
13.1%  15.8% 
18.2%  24.3%  20.1% 
4.5%  5.1%     N/A 
  4  4.7%  0.0%  6.2%  4.8%  4.7%  8.3%  10.8%  11.7%  9.1%  4.9%  6.4%  12.0%  12.3%  5.5%  5.8%     N/A 
  5  6.0%  0.0%  7.2%  5.6%  6.0%  8.3%  7.7%  8.4%  8.3%  6.2% 
18.5% 
7.4% 
14.3%  13.7% 
10.5%  10.3% 
19.9%  19.6%  18.6% 
6.3%  6.7%     N/A 
  6  7.6%  0.0%  8.7%  6.8%  7.7%  7.5%  8.9%  5.3%  7.4%  7.7%  8.7%  9.9%  7.3%  7.5%  7.8%     N/A 
   7  9.7%  0.0%  9.6%  7.5%  9.8%  8.0%  3.6%  3.6%  6.9%  9.6% 
20.7% 
9.3% 
21.7%  22.1% 
8.6%  6.1% 
21.4%  15.7%  16.7% 
8.2%  9.4%     N/A 
   8  12.6%  0.2%  12.3%  9.7%  12.8%  6.9%  3.3%  2.1%  5.9%  12.4%  12.0%  7.0%  4.5%  10.6%  11.6%     N/A 
   9  17.4%  5.7%  16.0%  13.8%  17.6%  4.8%  1.2%  1.1%  3.9%  16.8% 
40.2% 
15.4% 
44.3%  51.4% 
6.9%  2.9% 
23.5%  12.8%  19.9% 
14.6%  15.5%     N/A 
   10  35.9%  94.1%  27.8%  42.3%  35.4%  3.4%  2.9%  0.8%  3.0%  33.6%  27.1%  5.2%  1.7%  36.3%  30.0%     N/A 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     N/A 
Bolivia 
1  0.5% 
     
0.5% 
 
21.8%  8.7%  19.2%  1.1%  2.5%  1.0%  1.0%  1.1%  6.5%  10.8% 
 
7.1%  10.8%  1.0%  1.8%  1.6%  N/A 
 
2  1.8%           1.8%     12.2%  9.8%  11.8%  2.1%  5.6%  1.9%  1.8%  2.1%  8.7%  11.2%     8.8%  9.7%  1.9%  2.9%  2.6%  N/A 
   3  3.0%           3.0%     4.8%  10.5%  5.9%  3.1%  8.1%  2.7%  2.7%  3.2%  10.3%  8.7%     10.3%  8.9%  2.7%  4.0%  3.7%  N/A 
   4  4.1%           4.1%     6.7%  11.0%  7.6%  4.2%  9.5%  3.9%  3.8%  4.3%  10.5%  10.6%     10.4%  9.5%  3.9%  5.0%  4.7%  N/A 
   5  5.4%           5.4%     5.1%  10.8%  6.2%  5.4%  9.8%  5.0%  5.0%  5.5%  9.8%  9.8%     9.7%  8.6%  5.0%  5.9%  5.8%  N/A 
   6  7.0%           7.0%     6.2%  9.8%  6.9%  7.0%  10.9%  6.6%  6.6%  7.0%  11.5%  10.5%     11.5%  10.0%  6.6%  7.5%  7.4%  N/A 
   7  8.6%           8.6%     8.9%  11.5%  9.4%  8.7%  11.6%  8.5%  8.4%  8.7%  9.7%  9.6%     9.7%  9.7%  8.5%  8.8%  8.8%  N/A 
   8  11.2%           11.2%     8.8%  9.9%  9.0%  11.2%  12.7%  11.1%  11.0%  11.2%  12.6%  10.8%     12.4%  11.3%  11.1%  11.3%  11.3%  N/A 
   9  16.4%           16.4%     10.2%  11.2%  10.4%  16.2%  14.2%  16.1%  16.1%  16.2%  11.0%  10.7%     10.8%  10.7%  16.1%  15.5%  15.8%  N/A 
   10  42.1%           42.1%     15.2%  6.8%  13.5%  41.1%  15.2%  43.2%  43.5%  40.8%  9.5%  7.3%     9.3%  10.7%  43.2%  37.2%  38.4%  N/A 
Total  100.0%           100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  N/A 
Brazil 
1  0.8%  0.0%  0.2%  0.1%  0.8%  27.4%  35.2%  6.7%  10.6%  1.3% 
 
1.2%  1.2%  1.3%  15.5%  6.1% 
 
11.3%  11.1%  0.9%  2.7%  3.0%  N/A 
 
2  1.8%  0.2%  0.8%  0.5%  1.8%  19.4%  25.1%  5.7%  8.4%  2.2%     2.1%  2.1%  2.2%  13.5%  3.0%     8.8%  8.7%  1.6%  3.0%  3.2%  N/A 
   3  2.7%  0.2%  1.7%  1.0%  2.8%  15.0%  17.1%  6.0%  7.6%  3.0%     2.9%  2.9%  3.1%  12.2%  2.8%     8.0%  7.9%  2.4%  3.7%  3.8%  N/A 
   4  3.7%  0.4%  2.7%  1.6%  3.8%  13.3%  10.3%  7.0%  7.7%  4.0%     3.9%  3.9%  4.0%  11.0%  2.6%     7.3%  7.4%  3.3%  4.4%  4.5%  N/A 
   5  4.8%  0.7%  3.9%  2.4%  5.0%  10.2%  5.8%  9.5%  9.2%  5.2%     5.1%  5.1%  5.2%  9.5%  2.6%     6.5%  7.2%  4.4%  5.3%  5.3%  N/A 
   6  6.2%  1.1%  5.4%  3.4%  6.4%  6.4%  3.0%  9.4%  8.6%  6.6%     6.5%  6.5%  6.6%  8.9%  5.6%     7.5%  7.8%  5.6%  6.6%  6.7%  N/A 
   7  8.1%  1.8%  7.3%  4.7%  8.4%  3.3%  1.6%  9.5%  8.4%  8.4%     8.3%  8.3%  8.4%  7.7%  9.8%     8.7%  8.6%  7.3%  8.4%  8.5%  N/A 
   8  11.0%  3.4%  11.3%  7.6%  11.2%  2.0%  1.0%  11.6%  10.0%  11.1%     11.3%  11.3%  11.1%  7.8%  11.7%     9.5%  9.6%  10.3%  10.9%  10.9%  N/A 
   9  16.2%  8.4%  18.2%  13.7%  16.4%  1.9%  0.6%  11.4%  9.8%  16.1%     16.2%  16.2%  16.0%  6.7%  22.2%     13.6%  12.6%  15.5%  15.9%  15.9%  N/A 
   10  44.8%  83.7%  48.6%  64.9%  43.4%  1.1%  0.4%  23.1%  19.7%  42.2%     42.4%  42.4%  42.2%  7.2%  33.6%     18.8%  19.0%  48.8%  39.0%  38.4%  N/A 










Table 4.Concentration Shares of Income, Taxes and Transfers Cont. 
 
                                               
Mexico 
1  1.1%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0%  1.1%  7.2%  20.6%  0.9%  11.3%  1.4%  2.8%  1.1% 
 
1.4%  11.1%  10.0%  13.0%  10.7% 
   
2.3%  2.4%  0.2% 
 
2  2.3%  0.0%  0.5%  0.1%  2.4%  11.7%  17.5%  2.6%  10.9%  2.5%  4.5%  2.2%     2.6%  11.0%  9.8%  7.7%  10.5%        3.3%  3.4%  1.1% 
   3  3.3%  0.0%  1.5%  0.2%  3.4%  9.4%  14.5%  4.6%  10.0%  3.5%  5.6%  3.3%     3.6%  11.3%  9.9%  11.8%  10.8%        4.3%  4.3%  2.6% 
   4  4.3%  0.0%  2.7%  0.4%  4.4%  9.5%  10.5%  6.6%  8.8%  4.5%  7.3%  4.5%     4.5%  10.7%  10.0%  10.0%  10.4%        5.1%  5.1%  4.3% 
   5  5.4%  0.1%  4.1%  0.7%  5.6%  10.5%  8.6%  9.0%  8.9%  5.6%  8.7%  5.8%     5.7%  10.6%  10.1%  9.8%  10.4%        6.1%  6.1%  6.3% 
   6  6.7%  1.1%  5.7%  1.8%  6.9%  8.9%  7.3%  10.9%  8.9%  6.9%  9.8%  6.8%     7.0%  10.3%  10.1%  12.0%  10.2%        7.3%  7.3%  8.4% 
   7  8.6%  3.5%  9.0%  4.3%  8.7%  8.8%  5.5%  13.6%  9.1%  8.7%  11.1%  9.0%     8.8%  9.7%  10.4%  13.7%  10.0%        8.9%  8.9%  12.3% 
   8  11.1%  7.6%  12.7%  8.4%  11.2%  8.7%  4.1%  15.6%  9.2%  11.2%  12.3%  11.7%     11.2%  9.5%  10.4%  4.6%  9.8%        11.1%  11.1%  15.3% 
   9  16.0%  17.7%  21.2%  18.2%  15.9%  7.9%  3.6%  17.5%  9.6%  15.8%  15.1%  17.2%     15.7%  9.1%  10.4%  11.3%  9.6%        15.2%  15.1%  22.4% 
   10  41.3%  69.9%  42.4%  65.8%  40.4%  17.3%  7.8%  18.6%  13.1%  39.9%  22.9%  38.4%     39.6%  6.8%  8.8%  6.0%  7.5%        36.4%  36.3%  27.2% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%        100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Peru 
1  1.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  1.3% 
 
41.2%  23.1%  25.4%  1.4% 
 
0.5%  0.5%  1.4%  14.0%  3.8% 
 
9.5%  10.7%  0.4%  1.7%  1.8%  0.0% 
 
2  2.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1%  2.4%     24.8%  16.8%  22.8%  2.5%     0.8%  0.9%  2.5%  13.1%  4.4%     9.9%  10.9%  0.8%  2.8%  2.9%  0.2% 
   3  3.4%  0.0%  0.2%  0.0%  3.5%     16.2%  16.1%  16.4%  3.6%     1.9%  2.0%  3.6%  12.8%  4.9%     9.7%  10.2%  1.8%  3.8%  3.9%  0.8% 
   4  4.5%  0.0%  1.3%  1.0%  4.6%     8.2%  12.2%  12.4%  4.7%     3.0%  3.1%  4.7%  12.0%  6.1%     9.7%  9.9%  2.9%  4.9%  4.9%  1.4% 
   5  5.8%  0.0%  1.6%  1.4%  5.9%     4.9%  10.3%  9.0%  5.9%     4.5%  4.5%  6.0%  11.3%  7.8%     9.9%  9.8%  4.2%  6.1%  6.1%  2.9% 
   6  7.3%  0.0%  3.8%  3.1%  7.4%     1.9%  7.6%  4.9%  7.4%     6.7%  6.5%  7.4%  9.7%  7.4%     9.1%  8.8%  6.2%  7.5%  7.5%  5.4% 
   7  9.2%  0.0%  5.0%  3.7%  9.2%     1.1%  5.0%  3.4%  9.2%     9.2%  9.3%  9.2%  8.3%  9.6%     8.9%  8.4%  8.7%  9.2%  9.2%  7.3% 
   8  11.8%  0.0%  12.8%  10.6%  11.8%     0.9%  5.9%  3.6%  11.8%     11.7%  11.6%  11.8%  8.2%  13.1%     9.4%  8.9%  11.5%  11.7%  11.7%  13.6% 
   9  16.3%  2.0%  15.0%  12.1%  16.2%     0.7%  2.0%  1.5%  16.1%     18.2%  18.4%  16.0%  6.7%  16.2%     10.8%  10.1%  17.8%  15.8%  15.8%  20.8% 
   10  38.3%  98.0%  60.4%  67.9%  37.7%     0.1%  1.0%  0.6%  37.6%     43.5%  43.2%  37.2%  4.0%  26.8%     13.2%  12.2%  45.6%  36.4%  36.2%  47.6% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
 
Notes: 
For abbreviations see notes for Table 3 Incidence of Taxes and Transfers by Decile a
/ With Respect to Market Income 
b/  
a. For Argentina, the distribution of indirect subsidies and housing and urban were taken from secondary sources that used quintiles; thus deciles could not be used for all transfers or income definitions. 
b. N/A: means not applicable because there was no deficit in the contributory social security system in the year in question 
For information on what is included in each transfer or tax category by country see the notes to Table 3. 
c. Note that the above are "concentration shares" by decile. That is, the light grey columns for each definition of income are not the distribution of each income concept that would correspond to the Gini coefficients in 
Table 1. In the case of Argentina, the "x-axis" of the concentration curve uses households ranked by per capita NET market income; for all the others, households are ranked by market income. In Bolivia, market income and 
net market income are the same because there are no direct taxes are zero and contributions to social security are negligible.  
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Figure 1a. Concentration coefficients: Argentina 
 
 




Size of Budget 
(millions of pesos) 
As percent of CEQ 
social spending 




Program Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados  -0.54  878.00  0.5%  0.4%  0.1% 
Program Familias  -0.51  1,080.00  0.6%  0.4%  0.1% 
Asignacion Universal por Hijo Simulated (AUH)  -0.49  5,000.00  2.8%  2.0%  0.4% 
Seguridad Alimentaria  -0.48  1,288.00  0.7%  0.5%  0.1% 
Primary Education  -0.38  23,608.00  13.1%  9.6%  2.1% 
Health Primary Attention  -0.36  26,475.55  14.6%  10.7%  2.3% 
"Inclusion" Scholarships (Becas)  -0.32  250.00  0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 
Moratorium/Non Contrib Pensions  -0.30  26,633.00  14.7%  10.8%  2.3% 
PAMI- INSSJyP - Social assistance*  -0.26  2,071.50  1.1%  0.8%  0.2% 
Secondary Education  -0.24  21,563.00  11.9%  8.7%  1.9% 
Unemployment Insurance  -0.18  963.00  0.5%  0.4%  0.1% 
Obras sociales - Social*  -0.16  1,668.87  0.9%  0.7%  0.1% 
Other Federal Social Protection Programs*  0.00  2,955.00  1.6%  1.2%  0.3% 
 Water and Sanitation*  0.00  3,644.95  2.0%  1.5%  0.3% 
 Housing*  0.00  8,930.88  4.9%  3.6%  0.8% 
 Municipal and Provincial Programs*  0.00  17,368.00  9.6%  7.0%  1.5% 
PAMI Health*  0.13  9,363.50  5.2%  3.8%  0.8% 
 Other Urban Services*  0.14  11,118.28  6.2%  4.5%  1.0% 
Transportation Subsidies*  0.16  25,337.00  14.0%  10.3%  2.2% 
Other Education  0.19  11,148.00  6.2%  4.5%  1.0% 
University Tertiary Education  0.19  13,615.29  7.5%  5.5%  1.2% 
Energy Subsidies*  0.22  19,757.10  10.9%  8.0%  1.7% 
Manufacturing and Communications Subsidies*  0.55  5,791.00  3.2%  2.3%  0.5% 
Agricultural Subsidies*  0.55  7,473.00  4.1%  3.0%  0.7% 
Airline Subsidies*  0.80  2,300.00  1.3%  0.9%  0.2% 
Total CEQ Social Spending  -0.15  180,775.00  --  --  15.8% 
Total Redistributive Spending  -0.05  246,728.00  --  --  21.5% 
Total Primary Spending  N/A  430,401.00  --  --  37.6% 
Total Government Spending  N/A  459,961.00  --  --  40.2% 
Notes: 
* indicates that the source of spending was not captured by EPH, and thus it was estimated from other sources. See Pessino (2010). 
N/A means not applicable; some elements of that spending definition were not captured by the survey so the concentration coefficient was not calculated. 
CEQ (Commitment to Equity) Social Spending includes spending on Education, Health, Social Assistance and the Subsidized Portion of Social Security. 33 
 
Figure 1b. Concentration coefficients: Bolivia 
 
 
Table 5b. Concentration Coefficients and Budget: Bolivia 
Program  Concentration 
Index 
Size of Budget 
(millions of 
bolivianos) 
As percent of CEQ 
social spending 




Literacy Program (Yo si puedo)  -0.26  73.08  0.5%  0.4%  0.1% 
Programa de Atención a la Niñez (PAN)  -0.18  44.29  0.3%  0.3%  0.0% 
Bono Juancito Pinto  -0.15  293.98  2.0%  1.8%  0.3% 
Primary Education  -0.13  2,591.07  17.4%  15.6%  2.5% 
Initial Education  -0.10  149.81  1.0%  0.9%  0.1% 
Desayuno escolar  -0.10  8.09  0.1%  0.0%  0.0% 
Pensions (Sistema de Reparto Residual)  -0.03  3,752.68  25.2%  22.6%  3.6% 
Bonosol  -0.02  888.19  6.0%  5.4%  0.9% 
Seguro Universal Materno Infantil (SUMI)  -0.02  230.70  1.6%  1.4%  0.2% 
Health Spending (excluding SUMI)  0.05  3,372.80  22.7%  20.3%  3.3% 
Secondary Education  0.06  631.75  4.2%  3.8%  0.6% 
Benemeritos de la Guerra del Chaco  0.21  169.30  1.1%  1.0%  0.2% 
Gas Subsidy  0.28  499.39  3.4%  3.0%  0.5% 
University Tertiary Education  0.37  2,602.82  17.5%  15.7%  2.5% 
Technical Tertiary Education  0.46  374.68  2.5%  2.3%  0.4% 
Lactation and Maternity Subsidies   0.48  110.50  0.7%  0.7%  0.1% 
Total CEQ Social Spending  -0.05  14,864.89  --  --  14.4% 
Total Redistributive Spending   0.00  16,597.15  --  --  16.1% 
Total Primary Spending  N/A  41,798.50  --  --  40.6% 
Total Government Spending  N/A  43,144.40  --  --  41.9% 
Notes: N/A means not applicable; some elements of that spending definition were not captured by the survey so the concentration coefficient was not 
calculated. 
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Figure 1c. Concentration coefficients: Brazil 
 
 
Table 5c. Concentration Coefficients and Budget Shares: Brazil 
Notes: 
a. Size of budget is for 2009 except for Auxílio-Gás and Bolsa Escola, which are for 2008. Note that Bolsa Familia was intended to absorb both of these programs; by 2009 both had 
essentially been eliminated but they still existed when the 2008-2009 POF survey began in 2008, and some families reported benefits from them. 
b. Minimum income programs are administered at the sub-national (state and municipal) level and thus it is difficult to compile an aggregate for their size of budget. The figure given 
for size of budget here for Brazil's largest sub-national minimum-income program, São Paulo State's Renda Cidadã. 
c. Other government auxílios includes a variety of additional government transfers, usually targeted to poor households to assist with: milk, communications, electricity, physical 
disability, medical plan, childbirth, droughts, closures, and obtaining an identification card (cartão cidadão). Given the lack of public accounts data on the size of budget of all of the 
different auxílio programs included, the size of budget for this category is based on benefits received according to the POF survey, multiplied by a scaling up factor of241/191, based on 
the finding by Barros, Cury, and Ulyssea (2007: Table 4) that direct transfers are underreported by that factor. 
d. Overall health spending does not include demais subfunções to be consistent with the education budget (under education, demais subfunções is given as a sub-category of total 
education spending in public accounts, rather than distributed by level of education, thus spending by level is net of demais subfunções). 
e. N/A means not applicable; some elements of redistributive spending were not captured by the survey so the concentration coefficient of redistributive spending was not calculated. 
f. Brazil is the only country studied that does not include a question on its survey regarding use of health services or health coverage. Thus a secondary source (IBGE, 2009) was used to 
determine the distribution of health spending. Unfortunately this source does not break down health spending into sub-categories, some of which would probably be absolutely 
progressive while others would be relatively progressive (as we see in the other countries studied). Given the limitations of our secondary source, all of health spending must be 






(millions of reais) 
As percent of CEQ 
social spending 




Bolsa Família  -0.60  12,299.82  2.3%  1.6%  0.4% 
Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC)  -0.46  16,864.37  3.1%  2.2%  0.5% 
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil  -0.44  282.82  0.1%  0.0%  0.0% 
Bolsa Escola  -0.41  0.36  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Pre-school Education Spending  -0.34  9,566.32  1.8%  1.3%  0.3% 
Primary Education Spending  -0.33  75,081.87  13.8%  10.0%  2.4% 
Minimum Income Programs
b  -0.32  128.45  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Auxílio-Gás  -0.19  46.28  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Secondary Education Spending  -0.12  12,034.16  2.2%  1.6%  0.4% 
Other Government Auxílios
c  -0.06  419.93  0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 
Abono do PIS/PASEP  -0.03  7,280.24  1.3%  1.0%  0.2% 
Unemployment Benefits  0.17  18,599.90  3.4%  2.5%  0.6% 
Special Circumstances Pensions  0.23  72,564.11  13.4%  9.7%  2.3% 
Other Scholarships  0.32  3,540.46  0.7%  0.5%  0.1% 
Cesta Básica  0.38  42.93  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Tertiary Education Spending  0.45  26,006.03  4.8%  3.5%  0.8% 
Health Spending
d  0.45  130,622.74  24.1%  17.4%  4.1% 
CEQ Social Spending excluding Health
f  -0.05  412,299.76  --  --  12.9% 
Total CEQ Social Spending  0.13  542,922.50  --  --  17.0% 
Total Redistributive Spending  N/A
e  750,204.22  --  --  23.6% 
Total Primary Spending  N/A
e  1,173,831.12  --  --  36.9% 
Total Government Spending  N/A
e  1,629,853.41  --  --  51.2% 35 
 
 
Figure 1d. Concentration coefficients: Mexico 
 








Size of Budget 
(millions of pesos) 
As percent of CEQ 
social spending 




Oportunidades  -0.54  41,361.00  4.0%  2.4%  0.3% 
IMSS-Oportunidades  -0.54  6,370.72  0.6%  0.4%  0.1% 
Piso Firme (PAZAP)  -0.48  3,854.90  0.4%  0.2%  0.0% 
Programa de Empleo Temporal (PET)  -0.44  1,281.00  0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 
Seguro Popular   -0.39  36,428.87  3.5%  2.1%  0.3% 
Adultos Mayores (Federal)  -0.38  9,536.77  0.9%  0.6%  0.1% 
SSA Centros  -0.34  106,510.09  10.3%  6.3%  0.9% 
Primary Education Spending  -0.24  209,879.56  20.4%  12.4%  1.7% 
Pre-school Education Spending  -0.21  59,598.94  5.8%  3.5%  0.5% 
Lower Secondary Education Spending  -0.15  129,699.56  12.6%  7.6%  1.1% 
DIF Feeding Programs  -0.14  3,665.10  0.4%  0.2%  0.0% 
Vivienda (Tu Casa)  -0.12  1,638.50  0.2%  0.1%  0.0% 
Otros Dirigidos  -0.11  6,456.15  0.6%  0.4%  0.1% 
Procampo  -0.10  14,198.50  1.4%  0.8%  0.1% 
Liconsa (Milk)  -0.06  2,741.50  0.3%  0.2%  0.0% 
Hábitat  -0.01  1,887.40  0.2%  0.1%  0.0% 
Upper Secondary Education Spending  0.02  103,753.84  10.1%  6.1%  0.9% 
Opciones Productivas  0.10  1,157.10  0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 
Electricity Subsidy  0.14  99,934.00  9.7%  5.9%  0.8% 
VAT Exemptions  0.25  210,998.00  20.5%  12.4%  1.7% 
Employment Subsidy  0.26  34,756.00  3.4%  2.0%  0.3% 
IMSS Health  0.28  44,267.23  4.3%  2.6%  0.4% 
Gas Subsidy (LP)  0.28  24,262.00  2.4%  1.4%  0.2% 
Tertiary Education Spending  0.31  89,437.55  8.7%  5.3%  0.7% 
Other Scholarships  0.43  7,077.26  0.7%  0.4%  0.1% 
PEMEX, FA Health  0.46  10,291.51  1.0%  0.6%  0.1% 
Adultos Mayores (DF)  0.46  3,945.50  0.4%  0.2%  0.0% 
Gasoline Subsidy (IEPS)  0.46  195,503.90  19.0%  11.5%  1.6% 
ISSSTE Health  0.49  6,634.51  0.6%  0.4%  0.1% 
IMSS Pensions  0.62  95,256.80  9.3%  5.6%  0.8% 
ISSSTE Pensions  0.74  63,476.02  6.2%  3.7%  0.5% 
Total CEQ Social Spending  -0.05  1,029,746.00  --  --  8.4% 
Total Redistributive spending  0.12  1,699,091.00  --  --  13.9% 
Total Primary Spending  N/A
e  2,667,693.92  --  --  21.9% 
Total Government Spending  N/A
e  2,894,806.50  --  --  23.7% 














Figure 1e. Concentration coefficients: Peru 
 
 




Size of Budget 
(millions of pesos) 
As percent of CEQ 
social spending  As percent of GDP 
Juntos  -0.65  572.00  2.6%  0.1% 
Food Transfers  -0.38  1,008.97  4.5%  0.3% 
SIS  -0.37  464.20  2.1%  0.1% 
Primary Education Spending  -0.35  5,086.73  22.8%  1.3% 
Pre-School Education Spending  -0.25  1,357.08  6.1%  0.3% 
Secondary Education Spending  -0.20  4,085.15  18.3%  1.0% 
ESSALUD  0.46  5,156.68  23.1%  1.3% 
University Tertiary Education Spending  0.31  1,156.85  5.2%  0.3% 
  0.04  993.04  4.5%  0.3% 
Pensions  0.67  2,006.00  9.0%  0.5% 
Total CEQ Social Spending  0.15  20,313.00  --  5.7% 
Total Primary Spending  N/A  74,293.00  --  18.9% 
Total Government Spending  N/A  79,304.00  --  20.2% 
Notes:  
A figure for redistributive spending could not be generated for Peru because public accounts data estimating the size of the subsidy from IVA exemptions 
on food is not available. 
N/A means not applicable; some elements of that spending definition were not captured by the survey so the concentration coefficient was not 
calculated. 38 
 
Table 6– Description of All Programs in Tables 5 and Figures 1 
Argentina:    
Program Jefes y Jefas  Cash transfer program for unemployed with dependent children 
Program Familias  CCT Program for families with dependent children, subject to vaccination and schooling conditions 
Asignacion Universal 
por Hijo Simulated 
(AUH)  CCT Program for families with dependent children, subject to vaccination and schooling conditions more universal than Familias 
Seguridad 
Alimentaria  Nutrition program for poor families, usually as IN Kind boxes or School/Communities Restaurants 
Primary Education  Consolidated Spending on Primary Education 
Health Primary 
Attention  Consolidated Spending on Health, including Hospitals and Public Health but not Obras Sociales 
"Inclusion" 
Scholarships (Becas) 
Scholarships for Students from 13 to 19 years of age to  to stimulate the permanence, promotion and graduation from secondary 
school to children that assist to public schools and are at risk of educative failure and poverty 
Moratorium/Non 
Contrib Pensions 
Cash transfers for the elderly who had not fulfilled the requirement to receive contributory pensions of 30 years of contributions 
to the system, usually their amount is equal or less than the minimum contributory pension 
PAMI-INSSJyP - Social 
assistance  Social Programs managed by the Institute of Health Insurance for the Elderly (PAMI-INSSJyP) 
Secondary Education  Consolidated Spending on Secondary Education 
Unemployment 
Insurance  Unemployment Insurance Program for the Unemployed in the Formal Sector 
Obras sociales – 
Social  Social Programs managed by the Obras Sociales for formal workers 
Other Federal Social 
Protection Programs  Other Programs not included such as Community Programs not easily targeted to population 
 Water and 
Sanitation  Consolidated Spending on Water Provision, sewages and sanitation 
 Housing 
Consolidated Spending on providing subsidies in cash or in kind for improving or getting new housing (FONAVI is a major program 
included) 
 Municipal and 
Provincial Programs  All Municipal and Provincial Social Programs that are not easily included in the rest of Social programs 
PAMI Health 
Health Insurance and provision of health for the elderly managed by the Institute of Health Insurance for the Elderly (PAMI-
INSSJyP) 
Other Urban Services  Rest of Urban Services 
Transportation 
Subsidies  Consolidated spending on subsidies to Buses, Trains and Subways mainly 
Other Education  All Education Spending not included in Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Spending, including spending on Science and Technology 
University Tertiary 
Education  Consolidated Spending on Tertiary University Education 
Energy Subsidies  Consolidated spending on subsidies to Electricity, Gas, and Fuels 
Subsidy 
Manufacturing 
Communications  Consolidated Spending on Subsidies to Firms in the Private Sector and Communications 
Subsidies to 
Agriculture  Consolidated spending on subsidies to Agricultural Firms 
                                   
Bolivia:   
Literacy Program (Yo 
si puedo) 
Literacy program. Created in 2006 in order to eradicate illiteracy. Beneficiaries of the program are people excluded and 
marginated from education system. The program concluded in December 2008. Since 2009 a Post literacy phase was implemented 
in order to achieve the initial phase.  
Programa de 
Atención a la Niñez 
(PAN) 
Created in 1998. The program is aimed at improving nutrition, health, education and protection conditions to children less than 6 
years old. Initially administrated at the Central Government level, since 2006 it was implemented at local levels (municipalities).  
Bono Juancito Pinto  Conditional cash transfer of 200 bolivianos per year. Created in 2006 with the objective to incentive school assistance during the 
eight first schooling years. Initially financed by Government Enterprises YPFB and COMIBOL. In 2007 it reached 1, 3 beneficiaries 
from 13.565 schools ( 81,5% in rural areas and 18,5% in urban areas). Since its implementation it has amplified its beneficiary 
universe including special education. Regular assistance must be proven in order to receive the transfer.  
Primary Education  Primary education includes eight grades grouped into three sublevels, it is free and compulsory. First sublevel includes basic 
learning for children between 6 and 8 years old. Second sublevel includes essential learning and lasts three years. Third sublevel 
includes applied learning. In 2007, primary education spending accounted for 39% of total resources assigned to this sector.  
Initial Education  Initial education. In 2007, this education level was organized in two sublevels. The first sublevel was oriented to children from 0 to 
4 years old, at was not part of the formal system. The second sublevel (initial systematic learnings) was oriented to children from 4 
to 6 years old and was a responsibility of Ministerio de Educación. The main responsibility of this public institution with respect to 
initial education is to extend coverage with quality and equity.  With the new Education Law Avelino Siñani-Elizardo Pérez(2010) 
this level is free and compulsory.  
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Table 6– Description of All Programs in Tables 5 and Figures 1 Cont. 
   
Desayuno escolar  Food Program for population between 4 and 19 years old. The program gives beneficiaries breakfast. It was initially financed by 
the international cooperation. It was executed and implemented by Central Government since 2005. Actually it is administrated by 
local governments at department and municipal levels.  
Pensions (Sistema de 
Reparto Residual) 
Sistema de Reparto Residual is the residual "pay as you go system" reformed in 1996. The actual log run social security is private 
and administrated by Administradoras de Fondos de Pension (AFP).  
Bonosol  Non Contributory Pension, created in 1994. Beneficiaries are citizens 65 or more years old. It is cash transfer of 1,800 bolivianos 
per year. Initially financed by utilities from capitalized public enterprises. Since 2008 Bonosol was substituted by the Renta 




SUMI was created in 2003 with the objective to bring universal free health security to pregnant and reproductive age women and 
children less than 5 years old. The program was aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality by increasing health services 
utilization through the elimination of economic barriers.  
Health  (excluding 
SUMI) 
Health includes the following public services:  first level, free public security system, immunization programs, third level and Health 
Funds. In 2007 health spending represented 22% of Redistributive Spending.  
Secondary Education  In 2007, Secondary Education was organized into two sectors: technological learning and differentiated learning. It lasts four 
grades. Secondary Education accounted for 9,5% of total Education Spending . With the new Education Law Avelino Siñani-Elizardo 
Pérez (2010), this level is free and compulsory.  
Beneméritos de la 
Guerra del Chaco 
Transfer to war veterans of the Guerra del Chaco war occurred between 1932 and 1935.  In 2007 the program gave 1500 
bolivianos to each beneficiary once a year. This transfer was created in 1971. Resources for this transfer come from Tesoro 
General de la Nación accounts.  
Gas subsidy  Includes public resources assigned to liquefied gas, diesel and gasoline.  
University Tertiary 
Education 
At Tertiary Education level, public Universities  four categories of academic degrees: Técnico medio universitario (two years of 
study); técnico universitario superior (three years of study); bachiller en ciencias o artes (four years of study); y licenciatura (4 to 5 
years of study). In 2007 University Terciary Education Accounted for 39% of total Education Spending. 
Technical Tertiary 
Education 
Technical Tertiary Education. In 2007 this Education level accounted for 5% of total Education Spending. 
Lactation and 
maternity subsidies  
These two subsidies have been implemented since 1956 and were recognized as "Asignaciones familiares" by the Social Security 
Code.  Beneficiaries are children of public and private workers affiliated to Health Funds (Cajas de Salud). Maternity subsidy gives a 
transfer equivalent to one minimum wage per child born alive. Lactation Subsidy consists in products assigned monthly through 
Health Funds (Cajas de salud). 
                                   
Brazil:    
Bolsa Família  CCT program for poor families with children, conditional on school attendance, vaccinations, and pre- and post-natal care. Also has 
an unconditional cash transfer component for extremely poor households, regardless of whether the household has children. 
Benefício de 
Prestação 
Continuada (BPC)  Non-contributory pension for elderly poor. Beneficiaries receive one minimum salary per month. 
Erradicação do 
Trabalho Infantil 
Child labor eradication programs. Includes PETI, a CCT program mostly absorbed by Bolsa Família but only gradually phased out, 
and other social initiatives and cash transfers aiming to eradicate child labor. 
Bolsa Escola  CCT program for poor families with children. This program has been gradually absorbed by Bolsa Família; it was very small in 2008 
and almost non-existent in 2009. We include it in the analysis because some families report receiving benefits. 
Pre-school education 
spending 
Includes both creche (early childhood development) and infantil (pre-primary) education benefits;  grouped into one category 
because in public accounts, spending is grouped into this category. Includes spending at the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
Primary education 
spending  Spending on ensino fundamental (grades 1 through 9) at the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
Minimum income 
programs 
Includes a number of sub-national minimum income programs, which can be conditional or unconditional cash transfers, as well as 
Bolsa Renda. The largest sub-national program is São Paulo State's Renda Cidadã, implemented in 2001. In 2011, Rio de Janeiro 
State implemented the minimum income program Renda Melhor. 
Auxílio-Gás  Unconditional cash transfer to extremely poor families intended to subsidize the cost of gas. This program was absorbed by the 
unconditional component of Bolsa Família, but it still existed in 2008 and some families report receiving benefits. 
Secondary education 
spending  Spending on ensino médio (grades 10 through 12) at the federal, state, and municipal levels. 
Other government 
auxílios 
Includes a variety of additional government transfers, usually targeted to poor households to assist with: milk, communications, 
electricity, physical disability, medical plan, childbirth, droughts, closures, and obtaining an identification card (cartão cidadão). 
Abono do PIS/PASEP  Transfer to formal sector workers earning less than 2 minimum salaries and enrolled in the system for at least 5 years. Note that 
PIS/PASEP is a contributory system, but abonos are considered to be a non-contributory element of the system, while rendimento 
and saque from PIS/PASEP are the contributory elements and are included in market income. 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Includes seguro desemprego, salário desemprego, auxílio desemprego, and the program for the young unemployed Agente Jovem. 




These pensions (pensões and outros benefícios) are funded by the contributory pension system, but they are considered non-
contributory, as opposed to the normal pensions paid by the system (aposentadorias and benefício mensal). The special 
circumstances pensions are paid in the case of an accident at work, sickness, or related idiosyncratic shock. 
Other scholarships  Other education-related scholarships paid for by the government, excluding Bolsa Família and Bolsa Escola. Also includes credito 
educativo (education credit). A full list of the included scholarships is available upon request. 
Cesta básica  Transfer program to assist families with buying the basic food basket. In normal times it is targeted but during times of high food 
prices it can be more lenient. 40 
 
Table 6– Description of All Programs in Tables 5 and Figures 1 Cont. 
   
Tertiary education 
spending  Includes both university spending and technical tertiary education spending, which are grouped together in public accounts. 
Health spending  Health spending at the federal, state, and municipal levels. The size of budget is net of demais subfunções (other subfunctions) to 
be consistent with the education budget (under education, demais subfunções is given as a sub-category of total education 
spending in public accounts, rather than distributed by level of education, thus spending by level is net of demais subfunções). 
                                   
Mexico: Table 6 – Description of All Programs in Table 5 and Figure 1   
Health and Pensions 
IMSS   The principal social security institution providing health services (and other benefits) to private sector workers, created in 1943. Its 
pension system was reformed in 1997 to a “fully-funded”, defined contributions scheme administered by private entities. 
ISSSTE   The principal social security system covering federal and state government bureaucracy and workers.   
Health Services SSA  Health services for the uninsured provided by the state and federal government Health Ministries. 
Seguro Popular   Health program created in 2004 to provide basic health insurance to the (formally) uninsured, with a projected coverage of 12 
million households by 1010.  
IMSS-Oportunidades  System of rural health clinics for the uninsured targeted at poorer localities, administered by IMSS but funded by the Health 
Ministry, created in 1970’s as IMSS-Coplamar. 
Consumption Subsidies 
Gasoline and other 
fuels subsidy  Special tax on gasoline (IEPS) has become a negative tax, or a subsidy, since 2006, as price adjustments lagged the increase. 
VAT exemptions  Fiscal spending associated to value-added tax (VAT) exemptions on food and prescription drugs, principally. 
Agricultural Subsidies 
Procampo   Agricultural subsidy created in 1994 to compensate producers of basic crops for the opening up of agricultural markets under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, providing a direct transfer per hectare (instead of output as it used to). Agricultural 
Ministry. 
Agricultural Subsidy 
(Ingreso Objetivo)  Agricultural subsidy based on a target price. Agricultural Ministry. 
Programs Targeted to the Poor   
Oportunidades   CCT program created in 1997, currently covering 5 million households, providing direct monetary transfers conditional on school 
attendance and health visits. Originally targeted at poor rural communities, and basic education in 2001 it was gradually extended 
to urban localities and higher education services. Social Development Ministry. 
Vivienda (Tu Casa)  Housing credit program targeted to the uninsured. Social Development Ministry. 
DIF Feeding 
Programs   School breakfast and kitchen program. 
Liconsa (Milk)  Targeted milk subsidy program, providing rations of milk at half price in urban localities. Social Development Ministry. 
Programa de Empleo 
Temporal (PET) 
Workfare program created in 1995, providing a maximum of 88 days of work for low wage (originally 90 percent of the minimum 
wage, at present 99 percent).  
Opciones Productivas  Support for productive projects: organization, technical assistance, credit. Social Development Ministry.  
Rural Old Age 
Pension 
Universal rural non-contributive basic pension for the population 70 years or older created in 2007, with a 500 pesos (37 US 
dollars) pension per month. 
Other Scholarships  This category refers to the scholarship income reported by households in the ENIGH income and expenditure survey, excluding 
Oportunidades scholarships. 
Piso Firme (PAZEP)  Programa de Apoyo a Zonas de Atención Prioirtaria. Provides a cement finance to purchase material inputs to build cement floors 
for houses with dirt floors in poor rural localities. 
Hábitat  Urban development, infrastructure and participation program. Social Development Ministry. 
Microrregiones  Rural development program providing infrastructure and productive inputs to detonate local economic development. Social 
Development Ministry. 
                                   
Peru: Table 6 – Description of All Programs in Table 5 and Figure 1   
Juntos  CCT program for poor families with children, conditional on education and health requirements. 
Programa Integral de 
Nutrición (PIN) 
Food program (part of Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria [PRONAA]) that gives beneficiaries food baskets and food 




Food program (part of Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria [PRONAA]) that gives food and supplements through kitchens 
and shelters, among others.  
Vaso de Leche  Food program that gives breakfast to beneficiaries 5 times a week. It is run directly by all provincial and district municipalities. It 
relies heavily on mothers' clubs.  
ESSALUD  Public contributory health insurance system. 
SIS  Social program that guarantees free health care to Peruvians who are living in poverty and extreme poverty. 
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Table 7. Composition of Spending and Revenues by Progressivity  
 
  
Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil









Progressive - Absolute  60.4%  31.8%  34.8%  52.6%  72.2%  63.2% 
Progressive - Relative  39.6%  68.2%  65.2%  47.4%  27.8%  36.8% 
Regressive  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
CEQ Social Spending 
including subsidized 
portion of contributory 
pensions
b 




g  56.7%  57.45% 
Progressive - Relative  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  27.3%  33.38% 
Regressive  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  16.0%  9.17% 
Total  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  100.0%  100.0% 
Redistributive Spending 
including subsidized 
portion of contributory 
pensions
c 
Progressive - Absolute  44.5%  50.9%        42.8%    
Progressive - Relative  49.2%  49.1%        40.8%    
Regressive  6.2%  0.0%        16.4%    
Total  100.0%  100.0%        100.0%    












"poll tax"    
Progressive  6.4%  15.9%     52.3%  34.5%  16.6%    
Regressive  93.6%  84.1%     47.7%  65.5%  83.4%    
Total  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%    











"poll tax"    
Progressive  8.2%  20.4%     34.8%  36.5%  17.1%    
Regressive  91.8%  79.6%     65.2%  63.5%  82.9%    
Total  100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%  100.0%    
Spending as a percent 
of GDP 
Total Spending  40.2%  41.9%  51.2%  23.7%  20.2% 
Primary Spending  37.6%  40.6%  36.9%  21.9%  18.9% 
Redistributive 
Spending including 
subsidized portion of 
contributory pensions  21.5%  16.1%  17.4%  11.5%  Not available
f 
CEQ Social Spending 
including subsidized 
portion of 
contributory pensions  15.8%  14.4%  17.0%  8.4%  5.7% 
Direct transfers  3.1%  5.1%  4.1%  0.6%  0.4% 
Spending as a percent 
of social spending 
Direct transfers 
19.5%  35.1%  24.3%  7.3%  6.4% 
Notes: 
General note: the incidence of taxes was obtained from secondary sources mainly so the estimates of progressive and regressive shares should be viewed with great caution 
a. Defined as the sum of education, health, and social assistance spending. Social security spending is not included. 
b. Defined as the sum of education, health, social assistance spending, and the subsidized portion of social security spending. 
c. Redistributive spending includes various categories that are not included in "CEQ Social Spending excluding contributory pensions": the subsidized portion of social security, 
indirect consumer subsidies (e.g., food, electricity and gasoline subsidies), some producer subsidies (e.g., agricultural producer subsidies), and "social" tax expenditures (e.g., 
exemption of VAT for certain foodstuffs). 
d. For Argentina, the incidence of taxes is taken from various secondary studies including Pessino (2010) and Gasparini (1998). These were not ranked by market income, hence 
we are not able to distribute taxes exactly based on progressivity/regressivity as defined here, so for Argentina we give an approximated range based on available information. 
The column "lower bound" corresponds to the lower bound of progressivity, when inflation tax (regressive in relative terms) is included in the calculation and export taxes are 
considered relatively regressive. The column "upper bound" corresponds to the upper bound of progressivity, when export taxes are considered relatively progressive. For Peru 
and Bolivia, the percent of tax revenues that are progressive or regressive was not calculated because indirect taxes are not captured by the survey and secondary sources were 
insufficient. Indirect taxes are treated as an aggregate group; disaggregating them results in a higher percent of tax revenues that is progressive because a portion of indirect 
taxes are progressive, but they are regressive as an aggregate group. For Mexico, the two columns report the percentages when an oil "poll tax" is excluded and included; see 
Scott (2010) for more detail about the treatment of an oil "poll tax". 
e. Brazil is the only country studied that does not include a question on its survey regarding use of health services or health coverage. Thus a secondary source (IBGE, 2009) was 
used to determine the distribution of health spending. Unfortunately this source does not break down health spending into sub-categories, some of which would probably be 
absolutely progressive while others would be relatively progressive (as we see in the other countries studied). Given the limitations of our secondary source, all of health 
spending must be considered relatively progressive. Thus we report figures both including and excluding health spending from the calculation. 
f. A figure for redistributive spending could not be generated for Peru because public accounts data estimating the size of the subsidy from IVA exemptions on food is not 
available. 
g. N/A indicates not applicable because that country did not have a social security deficit in the year of the survey. 
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Table 8. Coverage and Leakages of Flagship Programs 
 
     
Share of benefits going to... 
  
  
Percent of beneficiaries who are... 
  
  
Percent of poor who are 
beneficiaries  Percent of 
      Poor <2.5 
Poor 




Spending  GDP 
ARGENTINA                                  
Jefas y Jefes de Hogar  37.70%  57.80%  42.20%  37.71%  58.11%  41.89%  4.71%  4.28%  1.83%  0.5%  0.1% 
Familias  39.40%  62.50%  37.50%  39.98%  61.91%  38.09%  34.17%  31.20%  12.53%  0.6%  0.1% 
Unemployment Insurance  28.70%  40.90%  59.10%  28.86%  41.93%  58.07%  1.97%  1.68%  1.00%  0.5%  0.1% 
Becas  25.20%  39.80%  60.20%  19.07%  33.91%  66.09%  1.36%  1.42%  1.04%  0.1%  0.0% 
Non Contributory Pensions  38.80%  48.10%  51.90%  28.92%  40.67%  59.33%  38.63%  32.04%  19.58%  14.7%  2.3% 
Food  39.70%  58.90%  41.10%  42.37%  63.85%  36.15%  19.48%  17.31%  6.74%  4.1%  0.7% 
Asignación Universal Por Hijo 
(simulated)  37.60%  60.00%  40.00%  33.35%  54.55%  45.45%  48.26%  46.55%  21.22%  2.8%  0.4% 
Above transfers
b  38.40%  51.10%  48.90%  30.61%  47.19%  52.81%  83.32%  75.75%  39.91%       
BOLIVIA                      
  
     
Bono Juancito Pinto  38.15%  61.36%  38.64%  38.15%  61.36%  38.6%  19.97%  19.30%  13.58%  2.0%  0.3% 
Desayuno Escolar  32.64%  54.87%  45.13%  33.43%  55.73%  44.27%  33.09%  33.14%  25.69%  0.1%  0.0% 
PAN  47.98%  62.02%  37.98%  47.98%  62.02%  37.98%  1.70%  1.32%  0.92%  0.3%  0.0% 
Bono Sol  40.11%  52.60%  47.40%  40.11%  52.60%  47.40%  8.01%  6.31%  5.18%  6.0%  0.9% 
Subsidio de Lactancia  0.15%  9.74%  90.26%  0.34%  9.90%  90.10%  0.01%  0.11%  0.47%  0.7%  0.1% 
Bono de Natalidad   0.00%  10.50%  89.50%  0.00%  10.50%  89.50%  0.00%  0.09%  0.36%       
Above transfers   34.90%  51.10%  48.90%  34.40%  54.72%  45.28%  42.82%  40.91%  32.29%       
BRAZIL                                     
Bolsa Família  49.26%  72.23%  27.77%  46.84%  70.29%  29.71%  54.67%  47.07%  17.80%  2.3%  0.4% 
Other scholarships  16.22%  19.72%  80.28%  18.04%  30.62%  69.38%  1.67%  1.62%  1.41%  0.7%  0.1% 
Benefício de Prestação 
Continuada (BPC)
a  37.02%  56.88%  43.12%  38.42%  57.67%  42.33%  5.43%  4.68%  2.16%  3.1%  0.5% 
Unemployment Benefits  6.21%  13.59%  86.41%  10.64%  19.73%  80.27%  3.18%  3.38%  10.32%  3.4%  0.6% 
Special circumstances pensions 
from INSS  9.91%  16.43%  83.57%  17.94%  29.07%  70.93%  12.15%  11.29%  4.56%  13.4%  2.3% 
Other social programs  11.17%  18.38%  81.62%  12.96%  22.98%  77.02%  2.42%  2.46%  2.85%  1.4%  0.2% 
Above transfers   15.36%  24.28%  75.72%  30.56%  47.27%  52.73%  69.29%  61.48%  34.58%     1.4% 




Oportunidades  41.33%  65.61%  34.39%  42.38%  66.41%  33.59%  61.85%  49.58%  19.70%  4.0%  0.3% 
Adultos Mayores  35.20%  53.51%  46.49%  27.28%  42.34%  57.66%  8.85%  7.02%  4.38%  0.9%  0.1% 
Procampo  29.30%  43.20%  56.80%  48.71%  66.86%  33.14%  13.84%  9.71%  3.83%  1.4%  0.1% 
Above transfers   37.80%  58.95%  41.05%  38.49%  60.64%  39.36%  66.79%  53.82%  23.42%       
Becas (excluding 
Oportunidades)  13.70%  19.39%  80.61%  10.39%  23.43%  76.57%  3.57%  4.12%  4.64%  0.7%  0.1% 
Other social programs  25.68%  38.53%  61.47%  33.29%  47.65%  52.35%  3.88%  2.84%  1.57%  0.0%  0.0% 
Seguro Popular  29.31%  52.10%  47.90%  29.31%  52.10%  47.90%  41.49%  37.72%  19.10%  3.5%  0.3% 
Contributory Health Insurance  1.70%  8.51%  91.49%  1.68%  6.86%  93.14%  4.85%  10.17%  39.10%       
Contributory Pensions 
(Imputed by pensioner)  0.60%  3.77%  96.23%  0.73%  3.87%  95.40%  0.16%  0.44%  2.98%  4.8%  0.8% 
Contributory Pensions 
(Imputed by pension income)  0.22%  1.58%  98.42%  0.73%  3.87%  95.40%  0.16%  0.44%  2.98%       
PERU                                     
Juntos  56.00%  81.00%  19.00%  58.61%  83.17%  16.83%  35.74%  26.59%  9.20%  2.6%  0.1% 
Food Transfers  32.00%  54.00%  46.00%  29.05%  50.88%  49.12%  39.44%  36.21%  20.47%  4.5%  0.3% 
Above transfers    46.88%  70.63%  29.38%  34.22%  56.77%  43.23%  57.65%  50.15%  25.41%       
Notes: 
                       
a. Recipients of BPC often mis-report this income source as a pension from the contributory system. 
b. With "Share of benefits going to…" all transfers refers to all transfers above. “With Percent of beneficiaries who are… " and Percent of poor who are beneficiaries," all 
transfers refers to at least one of the above 43 
 


















Acting Mechanism  Estimated Impact 






























Jefes did not 













move to the 
labor force and 
other programs. 
The number 
according to the 















In order to enroll, the potential 
participants had to request 
participation through the local 
municipality or through local 
offices of the Ministry of Labor. 
JJHD gives 150 pesos to each 
beneficiary. The co-
responsibility or condition that 
must be met by the beneficiary 
could be related to work, skills-
training, or education. Among 
the former, efforts related to 
productive or community 
projects run by municipalities or 
other public or private non-
profit organizations stand out, 
as well as (to a lesser extent) 
the incorporation of 
beneficiaries into companies 
through formal employment 
contracts. The other possible co-
responsibilities involve 
attending classes for skills-
training or formal education at 
the primary or secondary level. 
The daily commitment to the 
co-responsibilities must be not 
less than four hours and not 
greater than six. Although the 
program originally required 
workfare in exchange for the 
transfer, it is not clear that the 
condition was fulfilled by most. 
The aim of only targeting 
unemployed heads of 
households with dependents 
was clearly not realized; indeed, 
Galasso and Ravallion (2004) 
results suggest that a large 
share of participants were 
women who would have not 
otherwise have been in the 
labor force. About half of the 
employment gain due to the 
program came from 
unemployment and half from 
inactivity.  We estimate that the 
program reduced Argentina’s 
unemployment rate by about 
2.5 percentage points. This is 
less than half of previous 
estimates that have assumed 
that all Jefes participants would 
have otherwise been 
unemployed. Factoring in the 
foregone incomes, the program 
had a small effect on the overall 
poverty rate, though a more 
sizeable impact on the incidence 
of extreme poverty (see Galasso 
and Ravallion (2004) for the 
early evaluation of the 
program).                                                                                                                                                                                   
Most authors following this 
initial evaluation (see Bertranou 
and Paz (2007))  emphasize the 
increase in labor force 
participation brought about by 
this Program, especially from 
women. See Bertranou and Paz 
(2007) for a thorough review of 
other aspects in the evaluation 

















according to the 






























The amount of the transfer 
depends on the quantity of 
children. The average 
beneficiary household had 2.9 
children younger than 19 years 
old and received 215 pesos (in 
October 2007). The objective is 
to reduce the intergenerational 
transmition of poverty; the 
conditions are based on 
education conditions (minimum 
level of school attendance for 
children between 5 and 18 years 
old) and health (requirements 
for children and pregnant 
women). 
In 2006 an evaluation of the 
impact of Plan Familias para la 
Inclusión Social was released, 
four years after the program 
was launched (see Rosas, 2007). 
The evaluation was supervised 
by SIEMPRO and carried out by 
the Universidad Nacional de 
Tres de Febrero. An increase in 
school attendance, especially in 
the initial levels (EGB1 and 
EGB2), is an important 
accomplishment of the 
program. However, it should be 
noted that among beneficiary 
adolescents between the ages 
of 15 to 17, the percent that are 
not a part of the education 
system is still significant (13%). 
More information can be found 
in the study mentioned. 
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Table 9.Description of Flagship Transfer Programs Cont. 






CCT  Boys, girls, and 
adolescents in 
families that are 
unemployed or 
in the informal 
sector and do 
not receive 
another form of 
family allowance. 
If employed in 
the informal 
sector the salary 
should be 









The program is funded by the 
Fondo de Garantía de 
Sustentabilidad del ANSES. 
Among the characteristics of this 
program, it stands out that 
recipients of AUH cannot receive 
any other type of social plan and 
that the spirit of the program is 
to gradually phase out several 
others and replace them. The 
program explicitly excludes 
workers in the informal sector 
that earn more than the 
monthly minimum salary 
(Salario Mínimo Vital y Móvil). 
With respect to the health and 
education conditions, 20% of 
the benefit will be paid (credited 
to a bank account) at the 
beginning of each school year, 
as long as the beneficiary 
presents the required 
certification of vaccinations and 
school attendance. The current 
benefit is 180 pesos per month 
per child with a maximum of five 




















Special Laws and 
365,964 given by 
the Ministry of 
Social 
Development. From 










of pensioners in 
2008) 
These pensions have a long 
history in Argentina and are 
regulated by special laws. A 
portion of them are called 
“Pensiones Graciables” and are 
given by Congressmen to whom 
they consider deserving 
(supposedly poor) , another part 
were instituted by different laws 
and given to ex-presidents, 
veterans of Malvinas, families of 
the disappeared, some bishops, 
and others, and the last part are 
social protection non-
contributory pensions given by 
the Ministry of Social 
Development for the disabled, 
old age (more than 70), and 
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Elderly who had 










beneficiaries at the 




beneficiaries of the 
program). 
2005  20540 million 
pesos 
The moratorium law which is 
still in place allows an individual 
to pay its accumulated debt with 
the social security system at a 
discount as long as the debt was 
accumulated prior to 1993 and 
the amount is calculated 
between the year in which the 
individual was 18 years old and 
1993. This moratorium law was 
enacted in 1995, but in 2005 it 
was transformed into a 
permanent entitlement.  The 
number of beneficiaries will 
decline over time and eventually 
reach zero since it has a fixed 
date until when the moratorium 
is applied. For an eligible 
individual, he or she will receive 
800 pesos per month 
(moratorium pension in 2009 
equivalent to roughly 250 dollars 
per month) minus the 
moratorium contribution. 
According to data from the 
Administración Nacional de 
Seguridad Social, since 2005, 
when the new moratoria of the 
Plan de Inclusión Previsional 
was implemented, a total of 2.5 
million people were integrated 
into the pension system. The 
coverage rate of the pension 
system is 86.7%, reaching 
6,326,543 beneficiaries, 
between retired people, 
national pensioners and non-
contributory pension recipients. 
In 2003, before the moratoria 
previsional was introduced, the 
coverage rate of Argentina's 




















according to the 
survey 
2006  294 million 
bolivianos 
The program gives 200 
bolivianos to each student once 
a year conditioned on having 
attended school during the year.    
Previous evaluations have 
found low effects in reducing 













report  2008, not 
available for 2007; 
2,491,371 
according to the 
survey                          
2006  8.1 million 
bolivianos 
The program gives beneficiaries 
breakfast. It was initially 
financed by the international 
cooperation. It was executed 
and implemented by Central 
Government since 2005. 
Actually it is administrated by 
local governments, at 
department and municipal 
levels.  
Nutrition effects must be 
improved by introducing new 
products oriented to each 
targeted group. Parents must 
be informed about the limits of 
the program since some results 
of the evaluation find that 
beneficiaries of the program 
receive less food at home that 
the received portion before the 
program. This substitution 
effect must be avoided in future 
interventions (FAM, 2008)    
Programa de 









report 2008, not 
available for 2007; 
89,288  according 
to the survey                                                                                                                                            
1998  44.3 million 
bolivianos  
The program is aimed at 
improving nutrition, health, 
education and protection 
conditions to children. 
The lack of systematization of 
local practices has not 
permitted a consistent impact 
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Bonosol  Non 
Contributory 
Pension 
All citizens  
65 or more  
years old 
493,437 according 
to program reports; 
502,820 according 
to survey 
1994  888  million 
bolivianos 
The program gives 1,800 
bolivianos to citizens once a 
year.  Note that the program 
was replaced by the Renta 
Dignidad in 2008.The amount 
of Renta Dignidad is 600 
bolivianos higher than 
Bonosol. 
Previous evaluations found 
distributive and reducing poverty 
effects (Jemio, 2006). This 
evaluation finds a small Gini 
reduction in household income 
from 0,5210 to 0,5168 for 
household survey 2003-04 data. 
The distribution of benefits of this 
transfer favors poorer 
households. 40% of the 
beneficiary households belong to 
the three poorest deciles, this 
percentage increases to 60% in 
rural areas; showing a huger 














35,325 according to 
survey 
1956  111 million 
bolivianos  
Administrated by Health 
Funds.  
Lack of information did not allow 













45,593 according to 
survey 
1956  111 million 
bolivianos  
Products assigned monthly 
through Health Funds (Cajas 
de salud).  
Lack of information did not allow 
previous evaluations.  
Brazil 
Bolsa Família  CCT  Poor families 
with children 











according to public 
accounts; 7,958,558 
million households 
according to survey 
2003  12.45 billion 
reais 
Eligibility is determined 
through partially-verified 
means testing. Families in the 
program have an electronic 
card they can used to 
withdraw the monthly transfer 
at ATM machines. The transfer 
amount was, in September 
2009, 22 reais per child 0-15 
(up to three children), 33 reais 
per adolescent 16-17 (up to 
two adolescents) for families 
with income below 140 reais 
per capita per month and at 
least one child under 18 or 
pregnant woman (the 
"variable benefit"), and an 
additional 68 reais for 
households with income below 
70 reais per capita per month, 
regardless of whether there 
are children (the "fixed 
benefit"). The conditions are 
pre-natal and post-natal care 
sessions for pregnant women, 
adherence to a calendar of 
vaccinations for children 0-5, 
and a minimum level of school 
attendance for children ages 6-
17. There are no conditions for 
the "fixed benefit" given to 
extremely poor households. 
On poverty: Higgins (2011) finds 
that in 2009, Bolsa Família caused 
between a 12 and 18% decrease 
in the headcount index, between 
a 19 and 26% decrease in the 
poverty gap, and between a 24 
and 31% decline in the squared 
poverty gap at the national level, 
and it should be noted that the 
impact was much higher in rural 
areas. On inequality: Barros et al 
(2010) find Bolsa Família and its 
predecessor programs were 
responsible for 13% of the 
observed reduction in inequality 
from 2001-2007; also see Soares, 
Ribas, and Soares (2010), Soares 
et al. (2009), and Barros, 
Carvalho, and Franco (2007). On 
adult labor supply: negligible or 
no impact (Foguel and Barros, 
2010, Teixeira, 2008, Tavares, 
2010). On child labor supply: 
some impact on decision to work 
(Kassouf, Ferro, and Levinson, 
2010). Various studies show 
increased school attendance 
among recipient children; there is 
a lack of comprehensive 
evaluations of education 
outcomes. On health outcomes: 
no significant impact. 
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Monthly monetary transfer of 
one minimum salary (465 reais 
per month in September, 
2009) to elderly poor or 
incapacitated poor. Elderly 
means over 65 years old and 
incapacitated is determined by 
doctors based on ability to 
work. The definition of poor 
for BPC is household per capita 
income of less than one 
quarter minimum salary 
(116.25 reais per month in 
September, 2009). 
On inequality: Barros et al 
(2010) find that BPC was 
responsible for 10% of the 
observed reduction in inequality 
in Brazil from 2001-2007. 
Brasil Sem 
Miséria 
Mixed  Extreme poor 
(household per 
capita income 
of 70 reais per 






0  2011  0  Poverty mapping will be 
extensively used to identify 
areas with high concentrations 
of poor excluded from safety 
net system, and professional 
teams will be in charge of 
locating excluded extreme 
poor in assigned areas. One 
goal is that an estimated 
800,000 extremely poor 
families eligible for Bolsa 
Família but not receiving 
benefits will be enrolled. In 
rural areas, the program will 
provide professional technical 
assistance to farmers, improve 
irrigation systems, assist in the 
production of food products 
and access to markets, provide 
improved seeds and other 
agricultural technology to poor 
farmers, and provide a 
biannual monetary transfer of 
2400 reais to each eligible 
family for two years to buy 
inputs and equipment. In 
urban areas, the program will 
focus on the insertion of Bolsa 
Família recipients in the labor 
market. 200 types of free 
certification courses will be 
offered, along with free 
learning materials, lunch, and 
transportation. The 
government will produce an 
"opportunities map" to help 
locate labor market 
opportunities, and incentives 
will be provided for public and 
private companies that hire 
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Mexico 

























1997  41,361 
million 
pesos 
Provides direct monetary and 
in kind transfers conditional on 
school attendance and health 
visits. Targeted geographically 
and at the household level 
through a proxy-means test 
calibrated to match the official 
poverty measure in Mexico.  
Scholarships cover the last 
three years of basic education 
and high-school, with 
increasing values for higher 
levels, designed to 
approximate labor opportunity 
costs. Conditional on school 
inscription and attendance. 
Beneficiary households also 
receive a per household 
transfer conditional of 
attending health services, as 
well as nutritional 
supplements targeted at 
infants and pregnant woman.  
Reduction of 8% in poverty due 
to program benefits in rural 
communities. Positive effect on 
school enrollment for primary 
and secondary education. 
Increase in probability of 42% 
and 33% of entering secondary 
education for children 12 and 14 
years old in rural areas, 
respectively. 
Terminal efficiency of secondary 
education has increased 23% in 
areas where Oportunidades 
operates. Decrease in the 
proportion of dropout for 16 to 
19 year old adolescents in urban 
areas. 
Increase of one year of 
schooling for adolescents (15 to 
19 years old) who received 
program support for 5 years 
approximately in rural areas. 
Oportunidades families 
increased their preventive and 
curative visits up to 35% in rural 
areas. Adults increased 
preventive visits by 26% in 
urban areas. National maternal 
and infant mortality decreased 
by 11% and 2%, respectively. 
Increase of 1.42 cm in height for 
children under 2 years old in 
urban areas. Reduction of 20% 
of sick days for children under 5 
years old in rural areas. More 
than 90% of children receiving 
nutritional supplements show 
adequate consumption levels of 
iron, zinc and A and C Vitamins. 







of nine basic 
crops in 1993, 
representing  











1994  14,198 
million 
pesos 
Direct monetary transfer per 
hectare, originally set at close 
to 100 dollars per hectar to all 
beneficiaries identified in the 
original 1993 survey on the 
basis of cultivation of nine 
basic crops. Conditional on 
cultivation of the land, but 
after 1995 not conditional on 
particular crops. 
Significant multiplier effect on 
producer income. 








70 years and 
older living in 









2007  9536.7 
million 
pesos 
All the population of 70 years 
and older living in localities of 
30,000 or less are eligible for 
this universal rural non-
contributory basic pension of  
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Peru 











2005  512 million 
nuevos 
soles 
Juntos gives 200 soles to each 
family every two months 
conditioned to complying 
health and educational 
conditions. Families selected 
have to be poor or extremely 
poor according to the national 
poverty line. Geographical 
targeting and community 
assessments are used to 
identify beneficiaries.   
Significant effects over: 
consumption and poverty 
indicators, school attendance, 
health checks and likelihood to 
seek medical help among 
children under 6, doctor 
assisted deliveries and the use 
of contraceptives among 
women of childbearing age 
Programa Integral 


































2006 (A fusion 








The program gives 
beneficiaries food baskets and 
food supplements through 
health posts, pre-schools and 
schools 
Past evaluations of the 
programmes that now are part 
of the PIN found: i) PANFAR 
program: nutritional effects 
conditioned to proper 
attention; ii) School breakfast: 
improved dietary intake and 
short-term memory. Increased 




















































The program has been 
transferred to local 
governments. Beneficiaries 
receive food and supplements 
through kitchens, shelters, 
among others. 
The program has not been 
evaluated. 
















1985  363 million 
nuevos 
soles 
Gives breakfast to 
beneficiaries 5 times a week. 
It is run directly by 
all provincial and 
district municipalities. It relies 
heavily on mothers' clubs.  
The program has not been 
recently evaluated. Past 
evaluations found non-
significant effects over 
nutritional variables 
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   Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Mexico  Peru 
   2009  2007  2009  2008  2009 
Survey info 
Survey name  Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares 
Encuesta de hogares  Pesquisa de Orçamentos 
Familiares 
Encuesta Nacional de 




Acronym  EPH     POF  ENIGH  ENAHO 
Year  1st Semester 2009  2007 (from november 
the 1st to november 
30th) 
2008-2009  2008  2009 
Observations  93168 individuals  4.148 households  190,159 individuals; 56,091 
households (source: 
microdata) 
35,146 households   22,640 households 
Coverage  Urban  National  National  National  National 
INCOME MEASURE USED IN INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 
Pre-incidence 
Analysis Income 
Net Market Income   Net Market 
Income=Market 
Income (see 
description in "Direct 
Taxes" and "Employee 
Contributions to SS" 
below) 
Market Income  Net Market Income  Market Income 
INCOME CONCEPTS: DEFINITIONS, METHODS AND SOURCES 
MARKET INCOME 
Autoconsumption  Not included  Not included  Included; reported in survey  Included  Included 
Imputed rent for 
owner occupied 
housing 
Not included  Not included  Included; reported in survey 
("What do you think you 
would be paying to rent this 
dwelling?") 
Included  Included 
Earned and 
Unearned Incomes 







Included but all incomes are 
assumed to be net of 
income taxes and employee 
contributions to social 
security 
Included  Included  Included but all incomes are 
assumed to be net of 
income taxes and employee 
contributions to social 
security 
Included 
NET MARKET INCOME=MARKET INCOME - (DIRECT TAXES AND EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL SECURITY) 
Direct Taxes  Not reported in the survey 
and not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level.  Argentina 
used Net Market Income as 
the pre-incidence income. 
Whenever results are 
reported on incidence of 
direct taxes they come from 
Secondary Sources. The 
incidence is from Gasparini 
(1998). Where applicable, 
the amount is from 
Dirección Nacional de 
Investigaciones y Análysis 
Fiscal, Ministerio de 
Economía Argentina. 
Not applicable. There 
are no direct taxes 
applied to personal 
income. A tax that, in 
some way, substitutes 
a direct tax applied to 
personal income is 
the "Regimen 
Complementario  al 
Valor Agregado (RC-
IVA)". In 2007 this tax 
accounted for 1.4% of 
total  tax revenues. 
However this tax is 
not included in the 
analysis. 
Subtracted from Market 
Income to generate Net 
Market Income. Direct 
Identification Method. For 
wages/salary, "imposto de 
renda" and for other sources 
of market income "deduções". 
If the person reports receiving 
an income tax refund that is 
subtracted out of taxes paid. 
Not reported in the survey 
and not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level.  Mexico 
used Net Market Income as 
the pre-incidence income. 
Whenever results are 
reported on incidence of 
direct taxes they come from 
Secondary Sources. Taxes 
not reported in survey. 
Estimates based on official 
estimates by the finance 
ministry (SHCP, 2010), 
imputed by applying the tax 
law to the ENIGH data. 
Methodology used is 
consistent with imputations 
made for spending in 
present study. 
Subtracted from 
Market Income to 
generate Net Market 
Income. Direct 
Identification 
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Not reported in the survey and 
not included in the incidence 
analysis at the micro-data level.  
Argentina used Net Market 
Income as the pre-incidence 
income. Whenever results are 
reported on incidence of social 
security contributions they come 
from Secondary Sources. The 
incidence is from Gasparini 
(1998). Where applicable, the 
amount is from Dirección 
Nacional de Investigaciones y 





social security in 
Bolivia were almost 
zero in the year of the 
survey. 
Subtracted from Market 
Income to generate Net 
Market Income. Direct 
Identification Method. For 
wages/salary, "Previdência 
Pública" and "outras 
deduções". For other sources 
of market income it is 
assumed the deductions were 
direct taxes since there's only 
one category. If the person 
reports receiving a 
Previdência Pública tax refund 
that is subtracted out of 
contributions. 
Not reported in the survey 
and not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level.  Mexico 
used Net Market Income as 
the pre-incidence income. 
Whenever results are 
reported on incidence of 
contributions to social 
security they come from 
Secondary Sources. 
Estimates based on official 
estimates by the finance 
ministry (SHCP, 2010), 
imputed by applying the tax 
law to the ENIGH data. 
Methodology used is 
consistent with imputations 
made for spending in 
present study. 
Subtracted from 
Market Income to 
generate Net Market 
Income. Direct 
Identification 
Method.  Under legal 
deductions specified 
as "social security 
contributions."  




Inference Method. The incidence 
is estimated from the EPH survey 
assuming that those reporting 
receiving the minimum pension 
or less under pensions on the 
survey are recipients of non-
contributory pensions or 
moratorium pensions 
Direct Identification 
Method.  This transfer 
corresponds to the 
Sistema de Reparto 
Residual and is 
captured by the 
survey under  "non 
labor income".  
Direct Identification Method. 
Under other income Benefício 
de Prestação Continuada 
(BPC) is one of the categories. 
For Mexico, non-
contributory pensions were 
included in the column 
Targeted Monetary 
Transfers. 
Not applicable. There 
are no non-
contributory 




Direct Identification Method. For 
Argentina, targeted monetary 
transfers include Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar, Familias, Becas, and 
unemployment insurance. These 
are reported on the survey. 
Simulation Method. 
For Bolivia this 
column only includes 
Bono Juancito Pinto. 
All other transfers are 
under "other direct 
transfers". The 
method used was a 
simulation consisting 
of identifying eligible 
beneficiaries. 
Direct Identification Method. 
For Brazil this column only 
includes Bolsa Familia; all 
other transfers are under 
"other direct transfers". 
Direct Identification Method 
and Alternate Survey 
Method. The largest 
transfers are reported in the 
survey (direct identification 
method). Non-contributory 
pensions are also reported 
in the survey (direct 
identification method). 
Smaller transfers are 
imputed by the author, with 
the distribution being based 
on the micro-data of a 
special module of the 
equivalent 2006 survey 
(alternate survey method). 
Direct Identification 
Method. Directly 
from survey under 
"JUNTOS transfer". In 
Peru targeted 
monetary transfers 
include only JUNTOS.  
 
   52 
 
Appendix A: Description of Household Surveys and Methods and Sources to Construct Income Categories and their Components cont. 




Simulation Method. For Argentina, 
this column includes Asignación 
Universal por Hijo (AUH), which 
was not captured by the survey (it 
was implemented later in 2009) but 
is simulated according to the 
program rules, assuming perfect 






was used for the 
following monetary 
transfers: Bono de 
natalidad, Pago a 
Beneméritos, 
Pensions (Sistema de 
Reparto Residual) and 
Bonosol, and the 
following non-
monetary transfers: 
Bono de lactancia. The 
simulation method 
was used for the 
following non-
monetary transfers: 
D49Desayuno escolar                                               
Direct Identification Method. 
Includes: PETI, Bolsa Escola, 






(pensão do INSS, pensão da 
previdência pública, acidente 
de trabalho previdência 
pública, auxilio-doença da 
previdência pública), 
unemployment benefits 
(seguro desemprego, salário 
desemprego, auxílio 
desemprego, agente jovem - 
programa governamental 
para jovem desempregado), 
minimum income programs 
(programas de renda 
mínima, bolsa-renda), cesta 





eletrica, a portadores de 
deficiência física, para plano 
medico, moradia, 
maternidade, natalidade, 
defeso,  cartão cidadão) 
Imputation Method and 
Alternate Survey Method. 
Employment subsidy is 
imputed to formal sector 
workers using the subsidy 
table as defined in the 
2008 tax code. Opciones 
productivas is based on 
benefits reported in the 
2006 survey, adjusted to 
total amount reported in 




from survey under 
"food transfers". 
Includes: Vaso de 
Leche program 
and PRONAA.  
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POST-FISCAL INCOME = DISPOSABLE INCOME + INDIRECT SUBSIDIES - INDIRECT TAXES 
Indirect 
subsidies 
Income-only survey and hence not 
included in the incidence analysis at 
the micro-data level; available by 
quintiles or deciles only.   Whenever 
results are reported on incidence of 
indirect taxes and subsidies they 
come from Secondary Sources. 
Incidence is estimated using several 
secondary sources and 
assumptions: for energy we use 
quintile incidence on access and 
expenditure  of electricity and 
natural gas (based on the ENGHO 
expenditure survey for 1996-1997)  
from Marchionni et al (2004)  and 
Foster (2004). For transportation 
we use quintile incidence from 
Foster (2004) except the airlines 
subsidy (going entirely to 
Aerolineas Argentinas) where it is 
assumed that the entire subsidy 
accrues to the fifth quintile. For 
agricultural subsidies, it is based on 
administrative data from ONCCA 
(the government agency that 
administers agricultural subsidies) 
and Nogues (2008). Only few 
agricultural producers and 
agroindustries, and supposedly 
landowners, received these 
subsidies (see Scott (2008) on the 
incidence of agricultural subsidies--
even targeted ones--in Mexico) and 
hence we assumed 75% goes to the 
upper quintile and the rest is 
divided evenly among the rest of 
quintiles. The same assumption is 
made for subsidies to 
manufacturing and 
communications. 
Not included in the 
incidence analysis at 
the micro-data level; 
available by deciles 
only. Imputation 
Method. Subsidio al 
gas licuado (GLP). 
Imputations based on 
subsidized cost 




Not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level; available 
by deciles only. Used 
Secondary Sources;  the 
incidence and distribution 
in the columns for Indirect 
Taxes are actually the net 
effect of indirect subsidies 
and indirect taxes, based on 
secondary sources 
described under "indirect 
taxes." 
Not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level; available 
by deciles only. Imputation 
Method and Alternate 
Survey Method. Imputed 
using household spending 
reported in the subsidized 
goods and services.  In the 
case of residential 
electricity subsidies the 
imputation is based on a 
study of the 2006 survey 
which takes into account 
the complex tariff  
structure(Scott, 2009). 
Not included.  
Indirect 
taxes 
Income-only survey and hence not 
included in the incidence analysis at 
the micro-data level; available by 
quintiles or deciles only.   Whenever 
results are reported on incidence of 
indirect taxes and subsidies they 
come from Secondary Sources. The 
incidence is from Gasparini (1998).  
Not included in the 
incidence analysis at 
the micro-data level; 
available by deciles 
only. Secondary 
Sources. Effective rates 
applied by 
consumption and 
income deciles based 
on Cossio (2006). The 
rates include the 
aggregation effect of 
the following indirect 
taxes: Impuesto al 
Valor Agregado (IVA), 
Impuesto a las 
Transacciones (IT), 
Impuesto Especial a 
los Hidrocarburos y 
sus derivados 
(IEHD)and Impuesto al 
Consumo Específico 
(ICE).    
Not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level; available 
by deciles only. Secondary 
Sources. Based on the study 
Siqueira, Nogueira, and 
Souza (2005) who use POF 
2002-2003 and calculate 
the decile incidence of 
indirect subsidies and taxes 
(broken up into 17 
categories). In the future we 
will calculate directly from 
survey but the analysis is 
complex because of 
different tax rates for 
different items and in 
different states. 
Not included in the 
incidence analysis at the 
micro-data level; available 
by deciles only. Secondary 
Sources. Taxes not 
reported in survey. 
Estimates based on official 
estimates by the finance 
ministry (SHCP, 2010), 
imputed by applying the 
tax law to the ENIGH data. 
Methodology used is 
consistent with 
imputations made for 




reported on the 
survey. Evasion of 
indirect taxes is 
considered 
through two main 
assumptions: (i) 
people who live in 
villages under 410 
households do not 
pay taxes and (ii) 
all spending made 
on street vendors, 
"farmers markets" 
or other informal 
conditions does 
not pay taxes.  
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Imputation Method. The 
education benefit is based on 
cost per student by level and it is 
imputed for students who report 
attending public school. For 
those who report attending 
public school: if they attend 
primary school including pre-
school for age 5 that is 
mandatory also until age 12,  the 
benefit is 5484 pesos per year; 
for those between ages 13 and 
17 (corresponding to secondary 
school) the benefit is 8528 pesos  
per year. For those that attend 
Tertiary/university the benefit is 
8443 pesos per year. The latter 
category is used to impute 
education benefits but is not 
included in the calculation of the 
education coverage gap, in 
accordance with the CEQ 
Handbook. 
Imputation Method. 
Imputations based on 
cost per student by level, 
for those who report 
attending public school. 
58.57  bolivianos per 
capita; Primary 
Education: 122.49 
bolivianos per capita; 
Secondary Education: 
97.97 bolivianos per 
capita, University: 792.22 





Imputation Method. Per 
the CEQ Handbook, the 
education benefit is based 
on cost per student by 
level. This benefit is 
applied to students who 
report attending public 
school. For those who 
report attending public 
school: if they attend 
creche (early childhood) 
the benefit is 2276 reais 
per year; for those 
between ages 4 and 6 
(corresponding to pre-
school) the benefit is 2276 
reais per year (note 2276 
is the average government 
spending for initial which 
includes early childhood 
and pre-school); for those 
between ages 7 and 10 
(corresponding to lower 
primary) the benefit is 
3204 reais per year; for 
those between ages 11 and 
14 (corresponding to 
upper primary) the benefit 
is 3342 reais per year; for 
those between ages of 15 
and 18 (corresponding to 
secondary) the benefit is 
2336 reais per year 
(unless the student 
reports attending 
tertiary); for students who 
attend tertiary the benefit 
is 15,582 reais per year. 
Imputation Method. 
Imputed based on 
attendance of public 
school at each level 
reported in the survey 
and federal and local 
spending per student 
at the relevant level 




Spending is: Primary 
(ages 7-12):  11,400 
pesos (per year); 
Lower Secondary 
(ages 13-15): 17,600; 
Higher Secondary 
(ages 16-18): 23,600; 
University: 53,900. 
Imputation Method. 
Per the CEQ 
Handbook, the 
education benefit is 
based on cost per 
student by level. This 
benefit is applied to 
students who report 
attending public 
school. For those who 
report attending 
public school: if they 
attend elementary 
school, 1044 soles per 
year; if they attend 
primary school, 1254 
soles per year; if they 
attend secondary 
school 1367 soles per 
year; if they attend 
university, 3914 soles 
per year; if they attend 
technical superior 
education, 2711 soles 
per year. 
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In-kind 
health 
Imputation Method. Per capita 
government expenditure on health 
(PPP int. $ of 2006) from World 
Health Statistics 2009 (WHO 2009) 
actualized with Consumer Price Index 
until 2009, that amounts to 1190 
pesos per capita per year in 2009. 
This cost was similar to the cost of 
one of the least expensive health 
insurance programs provided in the 
Province of Buenos Aires by IOMA, of 
1200 pesos per capita per year in 
2009. Instituto de Obra Médico 
Asistencial (IOMA) (the public health 
provider for Buenos Aires Province) 
which costs a little more than 1200 
pesos per person a year, the health 
insurance for those that pay the 
Monotributo (equivalent to a 
simplified tax and social security 
regime for part of the self-employed 
who receive low incomes) (less than 
600 pesos per person yearly), and the 
low end Prepagas, which offered 
plans starting at about 2100$ pesos 
per person a year.  This shows that 
the cost estimated by WHO seems to 
be in between the costs of various 
providers that could offer health 
insurance to the poor, so we deemed 
it appropriate and adopted it for this 
study.   To calculate the health gap 
after transfers, on the basis of the 
EPH question about the health 
insurance coverage, the poor without 
health insurance privately paid or 
discounted from their wage is 
considered uncovered (or what is 
similar, it is the population that 
would be attended at public hospitals 
or paying health privately).For the in-
kind health benefits, individuals that 
declared not having health insurance 
(either private or from Obras 
Sociales) receive the imputed benefit 
Imputation Method. 
Imputations based on 
average cost of basic 
health package, for 
those who report to 
have attended a public 
health service during 
the last month. 
Imputations based on 
normal child birth for 
first level, second level 
and private house 
attention. The average 
cost of basic health 
service is imputed 
monthly  based on the 
annual per capita cost 
estimated by OMS in 
343 bolivianos . For 
normal child birth 
attention, imputations 
are based on three 
different average costs: 
72 bolivianos for first 
level health 
establishments, 97 
bolivianos for second 
level health 
establishments, and 34 
bolivianos for 
professional attention 
in private house.  
Secondary Sources. In POF 
there are no questions 
about use of health 
services or health 
insurance coverage. We 
used a study (IBGE, 2009) 
on the distribution of use 
(consultas and internações) 
of public health facilities 
by income group from 
PNAD 2008. To impute the 
health benefit to 
households we assigned 
them a share of health 
spending corresponding to 
the distribution of use. 
Imputation Method. 
Imputed based on 
affiliation to public 
health insurance 
institutions (IMSS, 
ISSSTE, PEMEX, Army, 
Seguro Popular) and use 
of public health services 
for the uninsured (SSA, 
IMSS-Oportunidades) 
identified by institution 
in the survey and federal 
and local public 
spending reported in the 
public accounts (federal) 
and health ministry 
(federal and local 
spending). The 
corresponding value of 
benefits are: IMSS-
Oportunidades 2,151 
pesos; SSA 2,394; Seguro 
Popular 1,787 (added to 
SSA); IMSS 4,218; ISSSTE 




from survey under 
the amount of health 







Secondary Sources. The incidence is 
from Gasparini (2004), except in the 
case of housing, where Gasparini 
(2004) used the ECV 2001 to impute 
housing loans estimating a CC of -
0.0761, slightly pro-poor. The EPH 
does not count with data on loans for 
housing; however since the year 
2000, the funds for FONAVI are from 
"free disponibility" and provinces can 
assign expenditure to the purpose 
they want. According to different 
sources, housing construction and 
loans from these plans have been 
decreasing and hence we assume 
equal incidence by quintile with CC of 
zero. Where applicable, the amount is 
based on public accounts. 
Not included  Not included  Imputation Method. 
Imputed based on 
beneficiaries reported in 
ENIGH, using spending 
on these programs 
reported in form Cuenta 
Pública. 
Not included.  
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Basically 0 in 2009  100% (negligible 
contributions to the 
social security system in 
2007). Thus social 
security is considered a 
direct transfer in the 
case of Bolivia. 
0% based on the following 
analysis: total federal INSS 
social security benefits 
paid in 2009 was 237,349 
million reais. We divide 
this into two categories: 
regular contributory 
pensions (aposentadorias 
and benefício mensal, 
totaling  164,825 million 
reais) and special 
circumstances pensions 
(pensões and outros 
benefícios totaling 72,564 
million reais). The latter 
are paid in the case of 
serious illness, 
hospitalization, accident at 
work, death of a spouse, 
etc.; i.e., they are intended 
to smooth idiosyncratic 
shocks. Because of their 
nature we consider these 
to be 100% government-
subsidized and treat them 
as a direct transfer. The 
benefits paid for regular 
contributory pensions are 
less than contributions to 
social security (over 
190,000 million reais), 
which means that there is 
no social security deficit 
for regular contributory 
pensions; they are entirely 




proportion subsidized is 
equal to ISSSTE, the 
principal social security 
institution serving public 
sector workers). For the 
analysis the proportion is 
allowed to vary by 
institution. Imputation 
Method. Subsidies to 
contributory social 
security pension systems 
are imputed based on 
reported pensions 
(which are not identified 
by source) combined 
with reported affiliation 
to the corresponding 
social security 
institutions. The 
proportion that is 
subsidized varies by 
institution. 
56%. Imputation 
Method. From public 
accounts, we 
calculate that 56% 
of pensions are 
subsidized by the 
government. We 
impute this subsidy 
to households, using 











(i.e., the government 
subsidized 56% of 
each pension 
recipient's pension). 




As EPH is Urban and does not even 
cover the whole Urban Population, 
EPH has first to be scaled to match 
up the population and then to 
match a comparable definition of 
income in National Accounts. Since 
only GDP is available in National 
Accounts, that definition is scaled 
down to Net Market Income and 
then compared to the expanded 
Net Market Income (for the whole 
population) from the EPH. The 
scaling up factor used was 1.414 
uniform for all income 
The scaling up factor 
value is 1.2648. 
Calculations are based 
on 2007 national 
accounts. However 
since there is no 
disaggregated 
information on income 
structure we use the 
average structure of 
years 2000, 2001, 2002 




Underreporting in POF is 
very low compared to an 
equivalent income 
definition in national 
accounts since the 
questions are so extensive. 
Barros, Cury, and Ulyssea 
(2007) compare total 
income in the 2002-2003 
POF to a very comparable 
definition of income in 
national accounts for 2003 
(they break it down by 
sub-category in their 
paper; see Table 4). Total 
income according to POF is 
1049 billion reais and 
according to national 
accounts is 1052 billion 
reais. (Note: 
underreporting is much 
more prevalent in PNAD; 
total income according to 
the 2003 PNAD was 830 
billion reais). 
8,249,423/3,750,891. 
Underreporting of total 
current household 
income in ENIGH 
compared to the closest 
equivalent in NAs is 
large, a factor of 2.2. This 
factor is applied to all 
household  income to 
ensure comparability 
between market income 
from the ENIGH and 
public taxes/spending 
form the federal public 
account.     
Total household 
income in ENAHO 
tends to be 
underreported by a 
large margin (a 
factor of 1.63) when 







survey were scaled 
up when they 
differed in more 
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Appendix B: Public Accounts and Other Country Information 
   Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Mexico  Peru 
   2009  2007  2009  2008  2009 
Macroeconomic Data: GDP, GNI and Population             
GDP in LCU - yr of 
survey 
1,145,458,336,366  103,009,182,446  3,185,125,000,000  12,200,100  392,565 
units  pesos  bolivianos  reais  millions pesos  million soles 
GDP/cap. in LCU - yr of 
survey 
28,544  10,482  16,718  83,963  13,475 
GNI in LCU - yr of 
survey 
1,110,233,876,588  109,775,035,955  3,121,048,000,000    369,195 
GNI/cap. in PPP - yr of 
survey 
14,030  4,069  10,140  14,530  8,349 
GNI/cap. in current 
US$ (market exchange 
rates, Atlas method) - 
yr of survey 
7,540  1,230  8,090  10,050  4,240 
PPP conversion factor 
- yr of survey 
1.965  2.745  1.712  8.136  1.700 
Population - yr of 
survey 
40,130,000  9,827,522  190,519,297  106,719,348  29,132,013 









430,401  41,799  1,173,831  2,667,694  74,293 
Notes  Spending includes 
estimation of central 
government, provincial, 
and municipal spending 
from different sources 
and using 2007 
spending for several 
projections 
Resources include central 
government, 
departmental, and 
municipal spending and 
revenues. 
Includes federal, state, 
municipal. Excludes 
debt refinancing 





Includes federal, state 
and municipal 
spending financed 
from federal tax 
revenues, excludes 
state and municipal 
spending financed 
from local taxes or 
fees. 
Includes the three 
levels of government 
spending: local, 
regional, national.  
Government Revenues by Category (millions of local currency units)        
Direct Taxes  97,783.44  4,325.10  187,395.80  265,947.60  20,346.00 
(Notes and source)  Includes federal and 
provincial direct taxes 
(Income Tax, Taxes on 
property, Wealth and 
Payroll Taxes) Source: 
Dirección Nacional de 
Investigaciones y 
Análisis Fiscal, 
Ministerio de Economia,  
MEyFP 
Direct Taxes include: 
Impuesto a las Utilidades, 
Impuestos Municipales, 
Regimen Complementario 
al IVA (RC-IVA). Source: 
"Dossier semestral 2010". 
Ministerio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas  & 
"Memoria de la Economia 
Boliviana 2010". Minsierio 
de Economia y Finanzas 
Publicas.  
Includes federal, state, 
municipal. Source: 
Balanço do Setor 
Público Nacional 
(BSPN), Brazilian 
Treasury (STN), 2010. 
Federal personal 
income tax.  Source: 
Cuenta de la Hacienda 
Pública Federal 2008, 
Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito 
Público (SHCP). 







Contributions to Social 
Security 
28,902.00  N/A  197,583.52  46,688.19  2,074.00 




Ministerio de Economia,  
MEyFP 
N/A  Includes federal and 
sub-national social 
security systems. 
Source: BSPN, Brazilian 
Treasury (STN) and 




contributions to IMSS 
and ISSSTE.  Source: 
Cuarto Inform de 
Gobierno, Presidencia 
de la República, 2010. 
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Appendix B: Public Accounts and Other Country Information cont. 
           
Indirect Taxes  144,669.11  10,762.40  350,987.97  531,626.10  33,768.00 
(Notes and source)  Includes federal and 




Receipts Taxes and 
Export and Import 
Taxes) Source: 
Dirección Nacional de 
Investigaciones y 
Análisis Fiscal, 
Ministerio de Economia,  
MEyFPThe amount is 
from Dirección Nacional 
de Investigaciones y 
Análisis Fiscal, 
Ministerio de Economía 
Argentina. 
Indirect Taxes include:  
Impuesto al Valor 
Agregado mercado interno 
(IVA), Impuesto al Valor 
Agregado mercado 
externo (IVA), Impuesto a 
las Transferencias (IT), 
Impuesto a las 
Transacciones Financieras 
(ITF), Impuesto al 
Consumo Específico (ICE). 
Source: We aggregate the 
mentioned taxes using tax 
revenue information from 
"Dossier semestral 2010". 
Minsiterio de Economia y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
Includes federal, state, 
municipal. Source: 
Balanço do Setor 
Público Nacional 
(BSPN), Brazilian 
Treasury (STN), 2010. 
Federal VAT tax, IEPS, 
ISAN, and Tenencia 
Vehícular.  Source: 
Cuenta de la Hacienda 
Pública Federal 2008, 
Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito 
Público (SHCP). 






Government Social Spending (definition used by CEQ) by Category and Indirect Subsidies (millions of local currency units) 
Direct Transfers  35,285.00  5,222.74  132,069.68  74,233.00  1,423.00 
(Notes and source)   Includes Jefes y Jefas 







and the Simulation of 
the Asignacion 
Universal por Hijo 
(AUH). Source: 
Estimated on the basis 
of Direccion de Analisis 
de Gasto Publico y 
Programas Sociales, 
MEyFP 
Direct Transfers include 
two categories: i) 
Monetary transfers (Bono 
Juancito Pinto, Bonosol, 
Pensions (Sistema de 
Reparto Residual), 
Beneméritos y Bono de 
natalidad. Ii) Non 
Monetary transfers 
(Desayuno escolar, Bono 
de lactancia). Source: We 
aggregate many transfers 
which come from the 
information system  
Sistema Integrado de 
Gestión y Modernización 
Administrativa (SIGMA)of 
Minsiterio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
Includes all categories 
from Table 7 except the 
categories 




Source: various (we 
aggregate many 
transfers which come 





Programa 70 y más, 
Procampo, Becas, 
Subsidio al empleo, 
and other smaller 
social programs. 









(SIAF), Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas 
(MEF), 2011.  
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Health Spending  35,840.00  3,492.98  130,622.74  333,417.00  6,469.00 
(Notes and source)  Health includes 
spending in public 
attention of health, 
which includes hospitals 
and other public health 
facilities' spending and 
public health 
campaigns, and it also 
includes PAMI-Health 
Coverage for Pensioners 
and Handicapped 
spending. Although this 
last spending is in 
theory financed by 
contributions from the 
active and passive 
(formal) population, it 
has traditionally run 
high deficits and its 
spending has been 
broadened to cover not 
only contributory 
individuals but also 
those without 
contributions and the 
handicapped. This 
definition of health 
spending does not 
include however, Obras 
Sociales spending that is 
fully contributed by 
workers and it is not 
subsidized by 
government. Source: 
Estimated on the basis 
of Direccion de Analisis 
de Gasto Publico y 
Programas Sociales, 
MEyFP 
Source: We aggregate the 
following accounts:   
Health Service 
Administration, first, 
second and third levels of 
health services, Health 
Funds and Immunization 
Programs .Data comes 
from       Sistema Integrado 
de Gestión y 
Modernización 
Administrativa (SIGMA) of 
Minsiterio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
Includes federal, state, 





Balanço do Setor 
Público Nacional 
(BSPN), Brazilian 
Treasury (STN), 2010. 
Includes federal and 
state spending. 
Source: Cuentas 
Nacionales de Salud, 









(SIAF), Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas 
(MEF), 2011.  
Education Spending  58,787.00  6,669.07  125,036.71  599,447.00  12,257.00 
(Notes and source)  Education includes 
spending in primary, 
secondary and tertiary 
education. It does not 
include spending or 
investment in Science 
and Technology and 
other educational 
expenditure not 
explicitly included in the 
above items. Source: 
Estimated on the basis 
of Direccion de Analisis 
de Gasto Publico y 
Programas Sociales, 
MEyFP 







Education and Literay 
Program "Yo si puedo". 
Data come from  Sistema 
Integrado de Gestión y 
Modernización 
Administrativa (SIGMA) of 
Minsiterio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
Includes federal, state, 
municipal. Includes 






additional (educação de 
jovens e adultos, 
educação especial); 
does not include demais 
subfunções. Net of 
demais subfunções is 
169,190.49. Source: 
Balanço do Setor 
Público Nacional 
(BSPN), Brazilian 
Treasury (STN), 2010. 
Includes federal and 
state spending on pre-
school (preprimaria), 
basic (primaria & 
secundaria), high 
school (media-
superior) and tertiary 
education. Source: 
Principales Cifras Ciclo 
ESCOLAR 2009-2010; 









(SIAF), Ministerio de 
Economía y Finanzas 
(MEF), 2011.  
 
   60 
 
Appendix B: Public Accounts and Other Country Information cont. 
           
Housing and Urban  23,694.11  344.68  39,166.29  3,526  564.00 
(Notes and source)  Housing and Urban 
includes spending in 
house subsidies, water 
and sanitation and 
other urban services. 
Source: Estimated on 
the basis of Direccion 
de Analisis de Gasto 
Publico y Programas 
Sociales, MEyFP 
Source:  We aggregate the 
following accounts: Urban 
Housing , Water and Basic 
Sanitation. Data come 
from Sistema Integrado de 
Gestión y Modernización 
Administrativa (SIGMA) of 
Minsiterio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
Includes rural and 
urban housing 





services, and collective 
urban transport. Both 
categories include 
demais subfunções; net 
of demais subfunçoes is 
32,659.88. Source: 
Balanço do Setor 
Público Nacional 
(BSPN), Brazilian 
Treasury (STN), 2010. 
39166.29+ 
Includes "Habitat" and 
"Tu Casa" progerams.  
Source: Cuarto Inform 
de Gobierno, 
Presidencia de la 
República, 2010. 
Includes subsidies to 
mortgages (449 million) 
and urban 
improvement programs 
(115 million). Source: 
Sistema Integrado de 
Información Financiera 
(SIAF), Ministerio de 
Economía y 
Finanzas(MEF), 2009.  
Indirect Subsidies  60,658.10  499.39  Not included in the 
analysis 
319,699.90  Not included.  
(Notes and source)  The amount of targeted 
monetary transfers is 
estimated from 
Direccion de Analisis de 
Gasto Publico y 
Programas Sociales, 
MEyFP, Minister of the 
Economy Argentina. 
Includes what is called 
"Subsidios Economicos" 
in Argentine fiscal 
accounts, and includes 





Includes liquefied gas 
(GLP), gasoline and diesel. 
Source:  Sistema Integrado 
de Gestión y 
Modernización 
Administrativa (SIGMA) of 
Minsiterio de Economía y 
Finanzas Públicas.  
N/A  Includes domestic 
electricity, gasoline 
and LP gas subsidies. 
Does not include 
implicit subsidies of 
fiscal spending on 
VAT. Including them it 
would be 530,698. 
Source: Cuarto 
Informe de Gobierno, 
Presidencia de la 
República; PEMEX; 
Informe de Gastos 
Fiscales, Secretaría de 
Hacienda y Crédito 
Público (SHCP). 
N/A 
 